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BULK BIOMETRIC METADATA COLLECTION* 
MARGARET HU** 
Smart police body cameras and smart glasses worn by law 
enforcement increasingly reflect state-of-the-art surveillance 
technology, such as the integration of live-streaming video with 
facial recognition and artificial intelligence tools, including 
automated analytics. This Article explores how these emerging 
cybersurveillance technologies risk the potential for bulk 
biometric metadata collection. Such collection is likely to fall 
outside the scope of the types of bulk metadata collection 
protections regulated by the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. The 
USA FREEDOM Act was intended to bring the practice of bulk 
telephony metadata collection conducted by the National 
Security Agency (“NSA”) under tighter regulation. In the wake 
of the disclosures by Edward Snowden in June 2013, members of 
Congress called for statutory reform to eliminate or significantly 
curtail indiscriminate metadata surveillance of United States 
citizens. The Snowden revelations illuminated that the bulk 
telephony metadata collection program had been legally justified 
under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. This Article 
contends that the USA FREEDOM Act, which amended Section 
215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, does not restrict other types of 
non-telephony bulk metadata collection. This Article concludes 
that, rather than more tightly regulating metadata surveillance, 
the Act allows for metadata surveillance to proceed under 
differing justifications and in more delegated contexts. The 
potential of ubiquitous and continuous data collection and 
analysis that may stem from smart body cameras or smart glasses 
worn by law enforcement offers an important case study on why 
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the USA FREEDOM Act is unable to regulate bulk biometric 
metadata collection. 
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 1426 
I.  BODY CAMERAS AND BIOMETRIC DATA COLLECTION ............. 1434 
A. What is Bulk Biometric Metadata Collection? .................. 1435 
B. What is Bulk Biometric Metadata Used For? ................... 1440 
C. Cooperative Biometric Data Sharing Between 
Privatized and State Law Enforcement and the 
Federal Government ............................................................ 1444 
II.  BULK TELEPHONY METADATA COLLECTION ............................ 1447 
A. The NSA’s Bulk Telephony Metadata Collection 
Program Under Section 215 of the USA 
PATRIOT Act ..................................................................... 1452 
B. Post-Snowden Legislative Reform: The USA 
FREEDOM Act .................................................................. 1456 
III.  POST-USA FREEDOM ACT ....................................................... 1468 
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 1472 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the contemporary market, police body cameras are generally 
understood to be first-generation technologies that execute one-
dimensional surveillance capacities.1 For example, most police body 
cameras available on the market are currently designed to store the 
audio-video recording of images captured in average definition 
through manual operation, subject to data storage limitations.2 Yet, a 
 
 1. A great deal of important scholarship has been produced on the legal and policy 
consequences of police body cameras in recent years. See, e.g., Kami N. Chavis, Body-
Worn Cameras: Exploring the Unintentional Consequences of Technological Advances and 
Ensuring a Role for Community Consultation, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 985, 987–89 
(2016); Mary D. Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, Police Body Cameras: Policy Splits, 68 
ALA. L. REV. 395, 397–401 (2016). 
 2. Mary D. Fan, Justice Visualized: Courts and the Body Camera Revolution, 50 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 897, 901 (2017) (“Small enough to be worn on the head, ear, or chest, a 
body camera can go everywhere officers go, providing audiovisual recording of what 
officers see, hear and do.”) (citing NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, A PRIMER ON BODY-WORN 
CAMERAS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 5-6 (2012), https://www.justnet.org/pdf/00-Body-
Worn-Cameras-508.pdf [http://perma.cc/3PYS-EL9M]). Body-worn cameras have been 
defined as “a small audio-video recorder with the singular purpose of recording 
audio/visual files, specifically designed to be mounted on a person.” Id. at 901 n.15 (citing 
S.F. POLICE DEP’T, BODY WORN CAMERAS POLICY, RECOMMENDED DRAFT 1 (2015), 
http://sanfranciscopolice.org/sites/default/files/FileCenter/Documents/27674-BWC%20VERSION
%201.pdf [http://perma.cc/4VM3-U6RW]). 
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next generation of smart police body cameras increasingly attempt to 
integrate live-streaming video with facial recognition and other 
artificial intelligence tools, such as automated analytics and database 
screening capacities.3 Similarly, smart glasses, if and when they are 
worn by law enforcement on a broad scale, will have the potential to 
facilitate a wide range of data sensor and analytic capacities.4 
Consequently, the emerging cybersurveillance capacities of smart 
police body cameras and smart glasses are not fully appreciated.5 This 
Article explores how these technologies facilitate biometric 
cybersurveillance6 through the capture and storage of biometric data 
such as facial images.7 According to one study, digital images of 117 
 
 3. See, e.g., Alex Pasternack, Police Body Cameras Will Do More Than Just Record 
You, FAST COMPANY (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/3061935/police-body-
cameras-livestreaming-face-recognition-and-ai [http://perma.cc/8NLQ-L3M]. 
 4. See, e.g., Jeremy Hsu, Face of the Future: How Facial-Recognition Tech Will 
Change Everything, NBC NEWS (June 11, 2013, 4:49 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id
/52172415/ns/technology_and_science-tech_and_gadgets/t/face-future-how-facial-recognition
-tech-will-change-everything/#.WpGZ0e7wZjQ [http://perma.cc/CY8L-NBJK]; Jon 
Russell, Chinese Police are Using Smart Glasses to Identify Potential Suspects, 
TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 8, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/02/08/chinese-police-are-
getting-smart-glasses/ [http://perma.cc/2RLZ-6X4A]. 
 5. For other important scholarship on surveillance, see, for example, Julie Cohen, 
What Privacy is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1931 (2013) (asserting that “[p]rotection 
against government surveillance is necessary if we are to avoid an Orwellian surveillance 
society”); Ashley S. Deeks, Intelligence Agencies and International Law, 102 VA. L. REV. 
599, 617 (2016) (“Other [governmental] activities stimulate far more concern, however, 
particularly when those activities directly implicate the life, liberty, and privacy of 
individuals not associated with governments. The recent [Snowden] leaks have 
illustrated—in ways that startled the general public—the prevalence today of that latter 
type of activity.”); Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Hiding in Plain Sight: A Fourth 
Amendment Framework for Analyzing Government Surveillance in Public, 66 EMORY L.J. 
527, 528 (2017) (“Where law enforcement is involved, these powerful new technologies 
also raise questions about how their use can be harmonized with the U.S. Constitution.”); 
Neil Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1934 (2013) 
(“Although we have laws that protect us against government surveillance, secret 
government programs cannot be challenged until they are discovered. And even when 
they are, our law of surveillance provides only minimal protections.”). 
 6. See, e.g., Margaret Hu, Biometric ID Cybersurveillance 88 IND. L.J. 1475, 1477 n.3; 
see also id. at 1480 n.15 (defining cybersurveillance as “the process by which some form of 
human activity is analyzed by a computer according to some specified rule. . . . [T]he 
critical feature in each [case of surveillance] is that a computer is sorting data for some 
follow-up review by some human.” (quoting LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, at 
209 (2006)). 
 7. The Current and Future Applications of Biometric Technologies: Joint Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Research & Subcomm. on Tech. Comm. On Sci., Space and Tech., 
113th Cong. 16 (2013) [hereinafter Romine Testimony] (statement of Charles H. Romine, 
Director, Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology) (“Biometric technologies can provide a means for uniquely recognizing 
humans based upon one or more physical or behavioral characteristics and can be used to 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1425 (2018) 
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million individuals, criminals and non-criminals, are already stored in 
a searchable federal, state, or local database.8 What may be less 
understood, however, is how biometric data collection also includes 
“associated metadata [collection]—information about the biometric 
characteristics or how [the biometric data] was collected.”9 This 
Article, therefore, focuses on one risk associated with these emerging 
surveillance technologies: the potential for bulk biometric metadata 
collection, a practice which is likely to fall outside of the scope of the 
types of bulk metadata collection protections regulated by the USA 
FREEDOM Act.10 
Metadata is data about data, which includes for example the time 
of a telephone call or the email addresses of a recipient and sender.11 
The USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 was intended to bring the practice 
of bulk telephony metadata collection conducted by the NSA under 
tighter regulation.12 In the wake of the disclosures by Edward 
 
establish or verify personal identity of individuals previously enrolled. Examples of 
physical characteristics include face photos, fingerprints, and iris images.”). 
 8. Clare Garvie, Alvaro Bedoya & Jonathan Frankle, The Perpetual Line-Up: 
Unregulated Police Face Recognition in America, GEO. L. CTR. ON PRIVACY & TECH. 
(Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/press-releases/half-of-all-american-
adults-are-in-a-police-face-recognition-database-new-report-finds.cfm [http://perma.cc/833X-
ZWQY].  
 9. New NIST Biometric Data Standard Adds DNA, Footmarks and Enhanced 
Fingerprint Descriptions, NAT’L INST. SCI. & TECH. (Dec. 6, 2011), https://www.nist.gov
/news-events/news/2011/12/new-nist-biometric-data-standard-adds-dna-footmarks-and-enhanced 
[https://perma.cc/BW77-8YSW]. 
 10. USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (codified at 50 
U.S.C. 1801 (2016)). 
 11. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COMM’R OF CAN., METADATA AND PRIVACY: 
A TECHNICAL AND LEGAL OVERVIEW 1 (2014), https://www.priv.gc.ca/media/1786/md
_201410_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/HXA7-ES6V] (“Simply put, metadata is data that 
provides information about other data. It is information that is generated as you use 
technology.”). 
 12. In an early version of the USA FREEDOM Act, the language of the statute 
stated the following purpose: “To rein in the dragnet collection of data by the National 
Security Agency (NSA) and other government agencies, increase transparency of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), provide businesses the ability to release 
information regarding FISA requests, and create an independent constitutional advocate 
to argue cases before the FISC.” See Alex Byers, Surveillance Reform Bill Outlined, 
POLITICO (Oct. 2, 2013), https://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2013/10
/surveillance-reform-bill-outlined-174157 [https://perma.cc/4YDR-VKXS] (quoting USA 
FREEDOM Act, H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 1599, 113th Cong. (2013)). The 
original acronym for the USA FREEDOM Act was Uniting and Strengthening America 
by Fulfilling Rights and Ending Eavesdropping, Dragnet-collection and Online 
Monitoring Act. Dan Roberts, The USA FREEDOM Act: A Look at the Key Points of the 
Draft Bill, GUARDIAN (Oct. 10, 2013, 5:16 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013
/oct/10/the-usa-freedom-act-a-look-at-the-key-points-of-the-draft-bill [https://perma.cc
/8CN6-ZSSL] (“The bill has a somewhat cumbersome title: [T]he Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ending Eavesdropping, Dragnet-
96 N.C. L. REV. 1425 (2018) 
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Snowden in June 2013,13 members of Congress immediately called for 
statutory reform to eliminate or significantly curtail indiscriminate 
telephony metadata surveillance of U.S. citizens.14 Congressman 
James Sensenbrenner (R-Wisc.), former Chair of the House Judiciary 
Committee and a sponsor of the Act, explained that the Snowden 
disclosures had revealed an intelligence community program that had, 
in his opinion, clearly exceeded the boundaries of the intent of the 
underlying law that had been used by the NSA to justify it: the USA 
PATRIOT Act of 2001.15 According to Congressman 
Sensenbrenner—one of the original architects of the USA PATRIOT 
Act16—the practice of mass, suspicionless collection of the metadata 
of every phone call by millions of Verizon subscribers daily for a 
period of several years was not within the type of intelligence activity 
that had been authorized, or even anticipated, by the USA 
 
Collection and Online Monitoring Act. But it’s one of those pieces of legislation that has 
been named for its acronym: the USA FREEDOM Act.”). The USA FREEDOM Act was 
modified in House Resolution 2048, sponsored by Congressman Sensenbrenner, to reflect 
the following title: “Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring 
Effective Discipline Over Monitoring Act.” Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 1, 129 Stat. at 268. 
 13. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 114-891 (2016); Barton Gellman, Aaron Blake & Greg 
Miller, Edward Snowden Comes Forward as Source of NSA Leaks, WASH. POST (June 9, 
2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/intelligence-leaders-push-back-on-leakers-
media/2013/06/09/fff80160-d122-11e2-a73e-826d299ff459_story.html?utm_term=.8e92cf79c0ed 
[https://perma.cc/3E2Z-5S5K]. 
 14. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of Sen. Ron Wyden, Wyden, Udall Statement on 
the Disclosure of Bulk Email Records Collection Program (July 2, 2013), 
https://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-udall-statement-on-the-disclosure-
of-bulk-email-records-collection-program [https://perma.cc/HJ35-KS84]; Press Release, 
Office of Sen. Ron Wyden, Wyden and Udall: Intelligence Community’s Response Leaves 
Important Surveillance Questions Unanswered (July 26, 2013), 
https://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-and-udall-important-surveillance-
questions-unanswered [https://perma.cc/QJ6Q-9Y8E]; Ellen Nakashima, Sen. Patrick 
Leahy Calls for End to NSA Bulk Phone Records Program, WASH. POST (Sept. 24, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/sen-patrick-leahy-calls-for-end-to
-nsa-bulk-phone-records-program/2013/09/24/85a21f66-252a-11e3-b3e9-d97fb087acd6
_story.html [https://perma.cc/L55Y-BTZE]. 
 15. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 
sec. 215, § 501, 115 Stat. 272, 287 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012)). See 
Matt Fuller, Sensenbrenner Slams NSA to European Parliament, ROLL CALL (Nov. 11, 
2013, 11:55 AM), http://www.rollcall.com/218/sensenbrenner-slams-nsa-to-european-
parliament [https://perma.cc/24AC-TUXU]; Jim Sensenbrenner, NSA Abused Trust, Must 
Be Reined in, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Nov. 2, 2013), http://www.jsonline.com/news
/opinion/nsa-abused-trust-must-be-reined-in-b99131601z1-230292131.html [https://perma.cc
/SPR8-W6LY] (“It ignored restrictions painstakingly crafted by lawmakers and assumed a 
plenary authority never imagined by Congress.”). 
 16. See, e.g., Patriot Act Architect Criticizes NSA’s Data Collection, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (Aug. 20, 2013, 5:22 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId
=213902177 [https://perma.cc/G8DV-P42B (dark archive)]. 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1425 (2018) 
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PATRIOT Act.17 The USA FREEDOM Act was intended to address 
what Congress perceived as a significant loophole in the USA 
PATRIOT Act that had allowed for bulk metadata collection.18 
With the election of President Donald J. Trump, commentators 
have placed greater attention on how the Trump administration will 
access and utilize tools of mass surveillance to achieve national 
security objectives.19 Administration officials have called for the 
return of bulk metadata collection.20 Understanding the limitations of 
the USA FREEDOM Act can illuminate why bulk metadata 
surveillance may likely be expanded. 
 
 17. Id. (“What Congress intended and what I intended is that the target had to be a 
foreign national and not a U.S. person. He would be targeted, and then they would find 
out who that person was calling, both in the United States and elsewhere, rather than 
grabbing all of the phone information and working backwards to the target.” (quoting 
statement of Congressman Jim Sensenbrenner)); see also Glenn Greenwald, NSA 
Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, GUARDIAN (June 6, 
2013, 6:05 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-
verizon-court-order [https://perma.cc/F7S2-LMD5]. 
 18. See Patriot Act Architect Criticizes NSA’s Data Collection, supra note 16. 
 19. Spencer Ackerman & Sabrina Siddiqui, Trump v US Intelligence: Growing Feud 
Puts NSA’s Legislative Priority at Risk, GUARDIAN (Mar. 7, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/mar/07/trump-nsa-us-intelligence-prism-reauthorization 
[https://perma.cc/37RR-TXYA]; Andy Greenberg, Just in Time for Trump, the NSA 
Loosens its Privacy Rules, WIRED (Jan. 12, 2017, 4:25 PM), https://www.wired.com
/2017/01/just-time-trump-nsa-loosens-privacy-rules/ [https://perma.cc/2EHN-QB5J]; Andy 
Greenberg, Imagine if Donald Trump Controlled the NSA, WIRED (Oct. 19, 2016, 7:00 
AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/10/imagine-donald-trump-controlled-nsa/ [https://perma.cc
/L4D3-Z2MB]; Chris Strohm, FBI and NSA Poised to Gain New Surveillance Powers 
Under Trump, BLOOMBERG TECH. (Nov. 29, 2016, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-29/fbi-and-nsa-poised-to-gain-new-
surveillance-powers-under-trump [https://perma.cc/N6M4-MNGA (dark archive)]. 
 20. Mike Pompeo & David B. Rivkin, Jr., Time for a Rigorous National Debate About 
Surveillance, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 3, 2016, 4:21 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/time-for-a-
rigorous-national-debate-about-surveillance-1451856106 [https://perma.cc/M76W-HECP 
(dark archive)]. 
Congress should pass a law re-establishing collection of all metadata, and 
combining it with publicly available financial and lifestyle information into a 
comprehensive, searchable database. Legal and bureaucratic impediments to 
surveillance should be removed. That includes Presidential Policy Directive-28, 
which bestows privacy rights on foreigners and imposes burdensome requirements 
to justify data collection. 
Id.; see also Jonathan Landay, Trump’s CIA Pick Supports Domestic Surveillance, 
Opposes Iran Deal, REUTERS (Nov. 18, 2016, 7:18 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
usa-trump-pompeo-newsmaker-idUSKBN13D2HM [https://perma.cc/2B25-BBCG]; 
Kaveh Waddell, Trump’s CIA Director Wants to Return to a Pre-Snowden World, 
ATLANTIC (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/11
/trumps-cia-director-wants-to-return-to-a-pre-snowden-world/508136/ [https://perma.cc
/ZS7F-U4WG]. 
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The USA FREEDOM Act, although a legislative achievement21 
that embodies a tremendous cooperative bipartisan political effort,22 
cannot be understood as a statute that regulates bulk metadata 
collection generally. Specifically, the USA FREEDOM Act is an 
achievement in that it forced Congress to meaningfully confront the 
role of proper legislative oversight in regulating the metadata 
surveillance activities of the NSA23 at the dawn of the big data 
revolution.24 Yet, this Article argues, rather than more tightly 
 
 21. Jennifer Steinhauer & Jonathan Weisman, U.S. Surveillance in Place Since 9/11 is 
Sharply Limited, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/03/us/politics
/senate-surveillance-bill-passes-hurdle-but-showdown-looms.html [https://perma.cc/ZS7F-
U4WG (dark archive)] (“The legislation signaled a cultural turning point for the nation, 
almost 14 years after the Sept. 11 attacks heralded the construction of a powerful national 
security apparatus. The shift against the security state began with the revelation by 
Edward J. Snowden, a former [NSA] contractor, about the bulk collection of phone 
records.”). 
 22. See, e.g., Presidential Statement on Congressional Passage of the USA 
FREEDOM Act, 2015 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 412 (June 2, 2015) (“I particularly 
applaud Senators Leahy and Lee as well as Representatives Goodlatte, Sensenbrenner, 
Conyers, and Nadler for their leadership and tireless efforts to pass this important 
bipartisan legislative achievement.”); Steinhauer & Weisman, supra note 21 (“The battle 
over the legislation, the USA [FREEDOM] Act, made for unusual alliances. Mr. Boehner 
joined forces with Mr. Obama, the bipartisan leadership of the House Judiciary 
Committee, and a bipartisan coalition of senators against Mr. McConnell and his 
Intelligence Committee chairman, Senator Richard Burr, Republican of North 
Carolina.”). 
 23. See, e.g., William C. Banks, Programmatic Surveillance and FISA: Of Needles in 
Haystacks, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1633, 1634–36 (2010); Christopher Slobogin, Panvasive 
Surveillance, Political Process Theory, and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 102 GEO. L.J. 1721, 
1755–58 (2014). See generally LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE FUTURE OF INTELLIGENCE: 
PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE IN A DIGITAL AGE (2016) (tracing the evolution of U.S. 
foreign intelligence law and pairing it with the progress of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence); Laura K. Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of International 
Telephone and Internet Content, 38 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 117 (2015) [hereinafter 
Donohue, Section 702] (analyzing the evolution of section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act Amendments Act, statutory issues related to upstream collection, and 
constitutional concerns accompanying these issues); Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata 
Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, 37 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 757 
(2014) [hereinafter Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection] (examining the bulk collection of 
metadata under the authority of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and related 
constitutional concerns); Peter Margulies, Dynamic Surveillance: Evolving Procedures in 
Metadata and Foreign Content Collection After Snowden, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (2014) 
(arguing for a more public advocate to hold FISC accountable in its decision making); 
Nathan Alexander Sales, Domesticating Programmatic Surveillance: Some Thoughts on the 
NSA Controversy, 10 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 523 (2014) (examining NSA 
programs and their benefits and drawbacks); Patrick Toomey & Brett Max Kaufman, The 
Notice Paradox: Secret Surveillance, Criminal Defendants, & the Right to Notice, 54 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 843 (2014) (discussing the requirement of notice as it applies to NSA’s 
secret use of electronic surveillance);  
 24. VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A 
REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 157 (2013) 
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regulating metadata surveillance, the USA FREEDOM Act allows 
for metadata surveillance to proceed under differing justifications and 
through more delegated contexts.25 As will be discussed below, bulk 
biometric metadata collection, for instance, can occur through 
corporate surveillance products contracted or acquired by homeland 
security and law enforcement organizations. The federal government 
could delegate collection to state and local law enforcement through 
cooperative data sharing, for example, of live-streaming video and 
other data collected by smart police body cameras or smart glasses. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I sets forth how police 
body cameras will likely create a vehicle for mass biometric collection 
generally and bulk biometric metadata collection specifically. This 
Part, by way of comparison, describes data garnered from the bulk 
telephony surveillance of telecommunications and the bulk biometric 
data facial imagery recognition. Part I then argues that the mass 
amount of data derived from body-camera surveillance initiatives has 
the potential to facilitate database compilation and interagency 
sharing at the federal level. It explains how this data collection and 
sharing will not be subject to effective oversight due to a lack of 
meaningful legal restrictions or administrative walls barring data 
sharing within the intelligence community or between federal and 
state or local law enforcement entities. Part I discusses the nature of 
cooperative data sharing between and among the U.S. Department of 
 
(“When the collection expands to information like financial transactions, health records, 
and Facebook status updates, the quantity being gleaned is unthinkably large.”); see also 
Mark Andrejevic, Surveillance in the Big Data Era, in EMERGING PERVASIVE 
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES (PICT): ETHICAL CHALLENGES, 
OPPORTUNITIES AND SAFEGUARDS 55, 56 (Kenneth D. Pimple ed., 2014) (“[I]n the era 
of ‘big data’ surveillance, the imperative is to monitor the population as a whole: otherwise 
it is harder to consistently and reliably discern useful patterns.”); David Lyon, 
Surveillance, Snowden, and Big Data: Capacities, Consequences, Critique, BIG DATA & 
SOC’Y, July 2014, at 1, 2 (“[A]s political-economic and socio-technological circumstances 
change, so surveillance also undergoes alteration, sometimes transformation.”); Omer 
Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of 
Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 241 (2013) (“The Obama Administration 
has recently announced a new, multi-agency big data research and development initiative 
aimed at advancing the core scientific and technological means of managing, analyzing, 
visualizing, and extracting information from large, diverse, distributed, and heterogeneous 
data sets.”). See generally JULES J. BERMAN, PRINCIPLES OF BIG DATA: PREPARING, 
SHARING, AND ANALYZING COMPLEX INFORMATION (2013) (explaining Big Data design 
and analysis); ROB KITCHIN, THE DATA REVOLUTION: BIG DATA, OPEN DATA, DATA 
INFRASTRUCTURES & THEIR CONSEQUENCES (2014) (discussing the various principles of 
Big Data); PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: FRAMEWORKS FOR 
ENGAGEMENT (Julia Lane et al. eds., 2014) (providing conceptual, practical, and 
statistical frameworks for analyzing emergent issues related to the data revolution). 
 25. See infra Parts I.C, II.B. 
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Homeland Security (“DHS”) and between state, local, and federal 
law enforcement. Part I then contends that DHS—which does not 
share the same statutory data collection restraints as the FBI or NSA, 
for instance—may, in a matter of time, commandeer the real-time 
data flow from state and local law enforcement body-camera feeds 
and other live video feeds like from smart glasses if and when worn by 
law enforcement or other video feeds. This metadata, once collected, 
can be aggregated into databases that are open to interagency queries 
and information sharing amongst the entire intelligence community in 
such a manner that effectively renders moot much of the “post-
Snowdengate”26 legislative efforts meant to restrain such activity. 
Part II provides a short overview of the NSA’s metadata 
surveillance program as it was revealed by the Snowden disclosures.27 
This Part includes a brief discussion on how the metadata surveillance 
program was justified by the NSA under Section 215 of the USA 
PATRIOT Act and then subsequently challenged in U.S. federal 
courts following the Snowden disclosures. Part II sets forth an 
overview of the USA FREEDOM Act as a vehicle for resolving some 
of the disputes surrounding the legality and constitutionality of the 
NSA’s metadata surveillance activities. It further summarizes why the 
USA FREEDOM Act is unlikely to bring metadata surveillance 
under proper oversight. These deficiencies include, for instance, the 
way in which the USA FREEDOM Act continues to allow for bulk 
metadata surveillance activities; the problem of “incidental” 
collection of the metadata of U.S. citizens during the course of foreign 
intelligence gathering; and the delegable nature of warrantless 
metadata surveillance that may allow for other intelligence agencies 
beyond the NSA to pursue bulk metadata collection of U.S. citizens 
under other authorities and contexts, such as the collection of data 
preserved by body cameras. 
Part III asserts that the post-USA FREEDOM Act era awaits 
clarification from the Supreme Court on the contours of the 
protections that will be offered by the Fourth Amendment in the 
digital age. This Article concludes that any attempt to constrain bulk 
metadata surveillance will necessarily include an assessment of the 
efficacy of this surveillance method, as well as an evolution of the 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Legislative reform alone that 
 
 26. See generally Margaret Hu, Post-Snowdengate, Post-Fascism, THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. (forthcoming) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (discussing 
how, in a “post-fascist” world order built on laws and liberalism, technological advances 
by the NSA allowed it acquire massive amounts of information). 
 27. See, e.g., Gellman et al., supra note 13. 
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focuses its attention on reining in the NSA’s bulk telephony metadata 
collection program specifically and reining in the government’s bulk 
collection of domestic records generally does not end the risk of mass 
metadata surveillance. The USA FREEDOM Act alone, therefore, is 
inadequate for its larger purpose: to secure freedom from mass 
surveillance and protection from suspicionless bulk metadata 
surveillance. 
This Article concludes that rather than more tightly regulating 
bulk metadata collection, the Act allows for metadata surveillance to 
proceed under differing justifications and in more delegated contexts. 
The potential of ubiquitous body cameras presents a case study on 
why the USA FREEDOM Act is unable to effectively regulate bulk 
biometric metadata collection and other types of bulk metadata 
practices. 
I.  BODY CAMERAS AND BIOMETRIC DATA COLLECTION 
Currently, body-worn cameras carried by state and local law 
enforcement are not ubiquitous nor are they multidimensional 
cybersurveillance systems.28 Emerging multidimensional systems 
embrace “situational awareness” technologies that attempt to 
integrate multiple sensors such as video surveillance and other image 
sensors with web scraping of social media platforms.29 Situational 
awareness technologies, for example, may aim to aggregate these 
surveillance methods with database screening and digital-watchlisting 
systems, such as DHS databases and the “No-Fly List,” to assess 
risk.30 Once pervasive, smart body cameras and smart glasses will 
 
 28. See, e.g., Body-Worn Camera Laws Database, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES 
(Oct. 27, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/body-worn-cameras
-interactive-graphic.aspx [https://perma.cc/L38A-785C]. 
 29. The integration of facial recognition technology with social media platforms and 
government databases yields significantly advanced surveillance capabilities in identifying 
and tracking individuals. Alessandro Acquisti, an associate professor of information 
technology and public policy at the Heinz College and a Carnegie Mellon CyLab 
researcher, for instance, conducted a series of experiments regarding social media sites 
and facial recognition. See More than Facial Recognition, CARNEGIE MELLON U., 
https://www.cmu.edu/homepage/society/2011/summer/facial-recognition.shtml [https://perma.cc
/A9UH-YT97]. First, his team “identified individuals on a popular online dating site where 
members protect their privacy through pseudonyms.” Id. Second, “they identified students 
walking on campus—based on their profile photos on Facebook.” Third, they “predicted 
personal interests and, in some cases, even the Social Security numbers of the students, 
beginning only with a photo of their faces.” Id. 
 30. See, e.g., DHS Monitoring of Social Networking and Media: Enhancing Intelligence 
Gathering and Ensuring Privacy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Counterterrorism and 
Intelligence of the Comm. Of Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 12–16 (joint statement of Mary 
Ellen Callahan, Chief Privacy Officer, Department of Homeland Security and Richard 
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likely work to collect biometric data and biometric metadata.31 
Biometric identification technologies—scanned fingerprints and 
irises, digitalized photos for facial recognition technology, and DNA, 
for example—increasingly inform law enforcement actions and 
support risk assessment tools. Once biometric identifiers are 
aggregated in databases, they can form the data backbone to support 
multidimensional cybersurveillance systems. 
Body cameras, as a first-generation technology, are currently 
one-dimensional in their surveillance capacities (e.g., only collect 
video footage and audio).32 As the technologies associated with body 
cameras evolve, they are likely to be used to tether biometric identity 
to multidimensional cybersurveillance (e.g., algorithmic-driven 
biographical screening and behavioral analysis).33 Body cameras may 
also one day be deployed to assess future risk and to isolate other 
data deemed suspicious.34 
A. What is Bulk Biometric Metadata Collection? 
To explain why the USA FREEDOM Act is unlikely to 
accomplish its purported original objective of securing freedom from 
unwarranted and suspicionless mass surveillance,35 bulk metadata 
 
Chávez, Director, Office of Operations Coordination and Planning, Department of 
Homeland Security); see also ZYGMUNT BAUMAN & DAVID LYON, LIQUID 
SURVEILLANCE: A CONVERSATION 12 (2013); Margaret Hu, Cybersurveillance Intrusions 
and an Evolving Katz Privacy Test, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 127, 133–37 (2018); Hu, supra 
note 6, at 1542–47; Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth 
Amendment, 89 WASH. L. REV. 35, 64 (2014); Slobogin, supra note 23, at 1749–50.  
 31. See, e.g., Alexandra Mateescu, Alex Rosenblat & danah boyd, Police Body-Worn 
Cameras 16–19 (Feb. 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.datasociety.net/pubs
/dcr/PoliceBodyWornCameras.pdf [https://perma.cc/QJF4-FBBS]; John Sanburn, Storing 
Body Cam Data is the Next Big Challenge for Police, TIME (Jan. 25, 2016), http://time.com
/4180889/police-body-cameras-vievu-taser/ [https://perma.cc/DPH2-8SAP]; Jay Stanley, 
Body Cameras Should Not Be Live-Streamed, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION: FREE FUTURE 
(Jan. 29, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies
/body-cameras-should-not-be-live-streamed [https://perma.cc/52H3-3XZR].  
 32. See, e.g., Research on Body-Worn Cameras and Law Enforcement, NAT’L INST. 
JUST. (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.nij.gov/topics/law-enforcement/technology/pages/body-
worn-cameras.aspx [https://perma.cc/LY5D-6Z5Q]. 
 33. See, e.g., Margaret Hu, Horizontal Cybersurveillance Through Sentiment Analysis, 
26 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 5) (describing 
surveillance in the context of “sentiment analysis,” a form of social media forecasting) (on 
file with the North Carolina Law Review). 
 34. Ava Kofman, Taser Will Use Police Body Camera Videos “To Anticipate Criminal 
Activity”, INTERCEPT (Apr. 30, 2017, 9:29 AM), https://theintercept.com/2017/04/30/taser-
will-use-police-body-camera-videos-to-anticipate-criminal-activity/ [https://perma.cc
/6Q4W-QUET]. 
 35. See Andrea Peterson, Why 76 Lawmakers Just Voted Against Their Own Bill to 
Reform the NSA, WASH. POST (May 22, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
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surveillance itself must be better understood. It is important to 
understand what metadata is, for instance, and why the intelligence 
community refers to metadata intelligence gathering and its 
accompanying search and analytic protocols as a “bulk metadata 
collection” and a “data query” program rather than a “surveillance” 
program.36 
Metadata surveillance does not include the conversation of the 
call or the written text of the email.37 Although digitalized 
surveillance methods are not new, automated and semi-automated 
bulk metadata surveillance methods are.38 According to the NSA and 
 
switch/wp/2014/05/22/why-76-lawmakers-just-voted-against-their-own-bill-to-reform-the-
nsa/ [https://perma.cc/4LLB-S233] (“The Senate must take up the original USA 
FREEDOM Act—which clearly ends bulk collection and which includes more aggressive 
steps to protect Americans’ privacy, such as important provisions to safeguard Americans 
from warrantless, backdoor searches of their private communications.” (quoting statement 
of Sen. Mark Udall)); Valerie Plame, Would You Rather Not Know?, POLITICO MAG. 
(June 5, 2014), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/06/thanks-edward-snowden-
107494 [https://perma.cc/XU9Z-GNEG] (“Our intelligence agencies should focus their 
efforts on terrorists and spies—and not law-abiding Americans.” (quoting statement of 
Sen. Mark Udall)). 
 36. See Ewen MacAskill, The NSA’s Bulk Metadata Collection Authority Just Expired. 
What Now?, GUARDIAN (Nov. 28, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2015/nov/28/nsa-bulk-metadata-collection-expires-usa-freedom-act [https://perma.cc
/CC9P-T85G] (“The intelligence agencies hate the description ‘mass surveillance’ and 
insist what they are doing is bulk collection of data. They argue that although they 
gathered all this material, they only looked at a small part of it and, crucially, did not look 
at content.”). See generally JENNIFER STISA GRANICK, AMERICAN SPIES: MODERN 
SURVEILLANCE, WHAT IT IS, & WHY YOU SHOULD CARE (2017) (describing the history 
of modern surveillance and the policy debate surrounding modern surveillance issues). 
 37. See, e.g., Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Surveillance Program Reaches 
‘Into the Past’ to Retrieve, Replay Phone Calls, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-surveillance-program-reaches-
into-the-past-to-retrieve-replay-phone-calls/2014/03/18/226d2646-ade9-11e3-a49e-
76adc9210f19_story.html [https://perma.cc/YLP9-96MC] (“Most of the programs have 
involved the bulk collection of metadata—which does not include call content—or text, 
such as e-mail address books.”). 
 38. Several scholars have noted how transformative technological shifts have also 
transformed methods of governance and surveillance as a tool of governance. See, e.g., 
Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2296, 2297 
(2014) (“The digital era is different. Governments can target for control or surveillance 
many different aspects of the digital infrastructure that people use to communicate: 
telecommunications and broadband companies, web-hosting services, domain name 
registrars, search engines, social media platforms, payment systems, and advertisers.”). See 
generally Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. 
REV. 1 (2008) (discussing the permanency and future of the national surveillance state); 
Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Rehnquist Court and Beyond: Revolution, 
Counter-Revolution, or Mere Chastening of Constitutional Aspirations? The Processes of 
Constitutional Change: From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 489 (2006) (describing the emerging regime of institutions and 
practices that make up the national surveillance state as the major constitutional 
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proponents of the bulk telephony metadata program, metadata 
collection is simply that: the collection or storage of pieces of 
metadata, data about data (e.g., time of a call).39 Once databases are 
assembled (e.g., the time of the calls of Verizon subscribers on a 
specific date), NSA intelligence analyst is able to seek information by 
“querying” the database.40 
From the Snowden disclosures, it appears the process of what we 
might call bulk biometric metadata collection may have already 
begun. Several NSA documents revealed that the NSA is compiling 
facial images extricated from intercepted communications via its 
global surveillance programs to be implemented in cutting-edge facial 
recognition initiatives.41 The agency’s utilization of facial recognition 
systems has expanded steadily—intercepting “millions of images per 
day” that include approximately 55,000 “facial recognition quality 
images.”42 The facial images represent “tremendous untapped 
potential,” as the NSA explained in a 2011 document.43 Therefore, 
this could be fairly characterized as a “bulk biometric collection” 
program. In other words, this disclosure appeared to reveal that the 
biometric data collection appears to be “bulk” (indiscriminate and 
suspicionless) and to share important similarities with the NSA’s bulk 
telephony metadata collection program.  
 
development of our era); David Lyon, Biometrics, Identification and Surveillance, 22 
BIOETHICS 499 (2008) (describing emerging systems that automatically check biometric 
data); Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321 (2008) (describing the 
collection and use of biometric data to exercise control over individuals); Lior Jacob 
Strahilevitz, Signaling Exhaustion and Perfect Exclusion, 10 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 321 (2012) (describing emerging biometric databases). 
 39. See generally Margo Schlanger, Intelligence Legalism and the National Security 
Agency’s Civil Liberties Gap, 6 HARV. NAT’L SECURITIES J. 112 (2015) (arguing that the 
intelligence community focused on the legality of metadata collection rather than the 
policy rationale of the program); PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT 
ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE 
USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
SURVEILLANCE COURT (2014), https://www.pclob.gov/library/215-Report_on_the
_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf [https://perma.cc/2R82-SFN3] (arguing that metadata 
is suggestive of the call’s content and recommending that the telephone metadata 
collection program under Section 215 be discontinued). 
 40. See, e.g., ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 797 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 41. See, e.g., James Risen & Laura Poitras, N.S.A. Collecting Millions of Faces from 
Web Images, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/01/us/nsa-
collecting-millions-of-faces-from-web-images.html [https://perma.cc/N73T-KLQX (dark 
archive)] (discussing Snowden disclosures that revealed that the NSA collects millions of 
digital photographs from Internet and social media sources and utilizes facial recognition 
technology to identify individuals). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
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To understand the similarities between what this Article refers to 
as NSA’s bulk biometric collection program and NSA’s bulk 
telephony metadata program, the rudimentary principles of facial 
recognition technology must be established. Facial recognition 
technology, like other biometric recognition technologies, 
necessitates a biometric template (e.g., face print from a digital 
photo).44 Facial recognition technology is not dependent upon the 
actual digital photo, but rather, utilizes a method of transforming a 
face into a “vector of numbers which represent the facial image’s 
characteristics including measurements [of facial features], color, 
lighting, 2D/3D [that facilitates] a Face Biometric Algorithm.”45 The 
process of algorithmically cross-referencing two facial images to 
determine a “match” is “not a match between two [biometric] 
templates, only a degree of statistical closeness.”46 Put differently, 
“algorithms are developed to ‘match’ the probability that the initial 
biometric data can be accurately compared to the currently presented 
biometric data or to make a determination that the data does not 
‘match.’”47 
Because facial recognition entails an algorithmically-driven 
process, the NSA would not be focused on the content of the digital 
image itself. Rather, from this disclosure, it appears that the NSA is 
concerned about the data about the data (e.g., metadata and other 
data that can be gleaned from the facial image and digital photo or 
video image). Securing and examining the content of the photo does 
not appear to be the primary objective of the intelligence 
organization. Instead, from the disclosures and the NSA’s response to 
this disclosure,48 it appears the NSA is primarily interested in data 
analytics and metadata analysis that can be informed by bulk 
biometric collection, i.e, the facial coordinates or numerical 
information that can be pulled from the digital image intercepted 
 
 44. Hu, supra note 6, at 1534–35, 1534 n.349. 
 45. Marc Valliant, Vice President & Chief Tech. Officer, Animetrics, Face 
Recognition Technology Today, Presentation before the NTIA Multi-Stakeholder Process 
to Develop Consumer Data Privacy Code of Conduct Concerning Facial Recognition 
Technology (Feb. 25, 2014), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntia
_feb252014_marcvaillant.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EWZ-QVQW]. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Hu, supra note 6, at 1535. 
 48. See id. (reporting that the Snowden documents stated “[i]t’s not just traditional 
communications [the NSA is] after: It’s . . . biographic and biometric information.”); see 
also Joseph D. Moran, NSA Metadata Collection and the Fourth Amendment, 29 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 985, 999 (2014) (noting that following the disclosures, both 
then-President Obama and then-Director of National Intelligence James Clapper 
emphasized the focus on metadata). 
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from the internet and social media, YouTube, Skype, etc.49 In NSA 
documents from this disclosure, it is revealed that facial recognition 
technologies are integrated with a wide range of databases in order to 
build “comprehensive portraits of intelligence targets.”50 
Therefore, the Snowden disclosures surrounding bulk biometric 
collection may be viewed as programmatically parallel to the 
Snowden disclosures surrounding bulk telephony metadata collection. 
The bulk telephony metadata collection program revealed by the 
Snowden disclosures was not concerned with the content or the 
conversation of the call. This type of telephony metadata collection 
now falls within the regulation of the USA FREEDOM Act. 
Biometric metadata, specifically, could include photo and video 
metadata (e.g., time and place of image) and other biometric 
metadata (e.g., metadata from biometric templates and biometric 
information records).51 Experts explain that a biometric template (e.g. 
face print, scanned fingerprint or iris), when combined with a name 
and biometric metadata, constitutes an “identifier” or a method to 
positively identify an individual or link an individual’s identity to her 
biometric and biographic data.52  
Bulk biometric collection and bulk biometric metadata collection 
operate similarly to the bulk telephony metadata program. Bulk 
biometric metadata collection programs are not necessarily concerned 
with the content or the substantive information revealed by the digital 
image. The Snowden disclosures revealed that the intelligence 
community was concerned with the analysis that could be associated 
with the metadata of telecommunications data. Similarly, the data and 
metadata aspects of the bulk biometric program appear to reveal that 
the intelligence community is concerned with the analysis that can be 
derived from facial recognition technology.53 The bulk biometric and 
bulk biometric metadata collection programs are poised to increase 
exponentially with the normalization of body cameras, does not fall 
within the regulation of the USA FREEDOM Act.54 
 
 49. See Risen & Poitras, supra note 41 (discussing the NSA’s use of metadata pulled 
from images stored on the internet). 
 50. Id. 
 51. See, e.g., C. Tilton, Biometric Authentication, NAT’L INST. SCI. & TECH. (Dec. 13, 
2016), https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/applyingmeasurementscienceworkshopjan12
_13_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/698U-JZKX]. 
 52. Valliant, supra note 45. 
 53. See e.g., Risen & Poitras, supra note 41. 
 54. After this disclosure, the NSA spokesperson explained that the collection of facial 
imagery was not justified under Section 215. Id. (“The N.S.A. does not collect facial 
imagery through its bulk metadata collection programs, including that involving 
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B. What is Bulk Biometric Metadata Used For? 
To understand bulk biometric data, it is first important to 
understand more about biometrics. “Biometrics is generally 
understood to be “[t]he science of automatic identification or identity 
verification of individuals using [unique] physiological or behavioral 
characteristics.”55 To begin, biometric-based identification or identity 
verification systems can collect and analyze “hard biometrics,” which 
is also known as “primary biometrics.”56 “Hard,” or “primary,” 
biometrics involve the traditional biometric identifiers that identity 
verification technologies use. These hard or primary biometrics can 
include “hand or finger images, facial characteristics, and iris 
recognition”57 Government and industry alike use these biometric 
data systems to reach “secure identification and personal verification 
solutions.”58 
However, biometric-based identification, or identity verification, 
systems also can collect and analyze “soft biometrics.”59 Hard and soft 
biometrics can be distinguished based on how reliable the biometric 
identifier is perceived to be in automated identification matching 
technologies. Soft biometrics have been defined as “anatomical or 
behavioral characteristic[s] that provide[] some information about the 
identity of a person, but does not provide sufficient evidence to 
precisely determine the identity.”60 “Soft,” or “secondary,” biometric 
identification systems can employ digital analysis or automated 
determination of characteristics such as age, height, weight, race or 
ethnicity, skin and hair color, scars, birthmarks, and tattoos.61 
Behavioral characteristics also can be part of the identity verification 
and analysis. Behavioral biometric identifiers are explained as 
 
Americans’ domestic phone calls, authorized under Section 215 of the Patriot Act, 
according to Ms. [Vanee M.] Vines [the agency spokeswoman].”). 
 55. JOHN R. VACCA, BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGIES AND VERIFICATION SYSTEMS 589 
(2007). 
 56. See id. at 590 (discussing “Biometric Technologies”). 
 57. See id. at 3. 
 58. Id. at 57–59. Vacca does not provide a definitive definition of hard or primary 
biometric data. Nonetheless, he does offer background regarding biometric technology 
and verification system standards. Other scholars have explained that soft, or secondary, 
biometric characteristics have an experimental nature that can augment hard or primary 
biometric characteristics. See e.g., Koichiro Niinuma, Unsang Park & Anil. K. Jain, Soft 
Biometric Traits for Continuous User Authentication, 5 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. 
FORENSICS & SECURITY 771, 771–772 (2010). 
 59. See, e.g., Niinuma et al, supra note 58 at 772 (defining the characteristics of both 
“soft” and “hard” biometrics). 
 60. Karthik Nandakumar & Anil K. Jain, Soft Biometrics, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
BIOMETRICS 1235, 1235 (Stan Z. Li & Anil K. Jain eds., 2009). 
 61. Id. 
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“characteristics that are learned or acquired.”62 Examples of these 
identifiers are gait analysis—including the manner and pattern of 
walking—and voice identification. 
After the collection of the biometric data, the data must be 
compiled in a database. This makes it possible to implement identity 
screening. When the government is the one to use these biometric 
identification technologies, it encourages surveillance, because 
biometric cybersurveillance not only identifies people, but also makes 
assessments based on identity. Biometric cybersurveillance thus 
constitutes an expansive inquiry; it surpasses determining who a 
person is to scrutinize people’s intent, such as their criminal and 
terroristic dispositions. Furthermore, the identification might, but 
might not, involve traditional “surveillance” activities (e.g., domestic 
or foreign intelligence gathering). Consequently, progress in 
biometric identification and its widespread usages are transforming 
the nature of cybersurveillance. 
Additionally, big data governance highlights how mass data 
collection and digitized assessments are being bureaucratized through 
practices that include data mining and database screening, digital 
watchlisting, algorithmic intelligence, and risk assessment and 
predictive analysis.63 Increasingly, biometric data is incorporated into 
these technologies, anchoring the effect of cybersurveillance-
dependent government programs.64 
Presently, biometric data, when sourced specifically to be fed 
into verification and identification technologies, are generally 
regarded by the public and private spheres alike as benign.65 Big data 
surveillance technologies allow for aggregating facial images with 
other databases and may constitute the first building block of a global 
photo database. 
From the government’s perspective, there is little distinction 
separating biometric credentialing as a reliable identification method 
from behavioral-biometric profiling as both initiatives share the same 
 
 62. VACCA, supra note 55, at 3. 
 63. See Margaret Hu, Biometric Surveillance and Big Data Governance, in 
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK ON SURVEILLANCE LAW 121 (David Gray & Stephen E. 
Henderson eds., 2017) (contending that “the biometric surveillance systems and precrime 
rationales fictionally portrayed in Steven Spielberg’s film Minority Report are now 
emerging as a governance reality”). 
 64. See id. (explaining how “[p]ublic and private decisionmaking protocols 
increasingly depend upon biometric identification technologies”).  
 65. See id. at 126 (identifying the conception that “[b]iometric data is supposedly 
scientifically objective and utilize a purportedly neutral analysis of computer driven 
algorithmic analysis”).  
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end goal: to advance security and pre-crime intervention via the 
combination of identification and risk analysis into one streamlined 
process.66 Biometric data gathered for one use, however, is 
repurposed for another—something that is unavoidable in a big data 
world because the biometric cybersurveillance platforms are 
increasingly programmed to support mass-data compilation and 
predictive policing. This is particularly concerning from a privacy 
perspective when it comes to facial imagery derived from law 
enforcement body camera data feeds. 
How biometric data can assist in targeting decisions, for example, 
has also been revealed through the Snowden disclosures and other 
revelations. Through recent media disclosures, it was reported that 
the Army has awarded at least a half-dozen contracts to technology 
firms to fuse facial recognition technology with drone technology.67 
Specifically, the contracts seek the development of algorithms that 
use two-dimensional images—like those that could be pulled from 
body camera feeds—to construct a 3D model of a face.68 The software 
is becoming so advanced that other biometric data can be substituted 
for facial imagery, as Tim Faltemier, the lead biometrics researcher at 
Progeny Systems Corporation, explains: 
[I]f the system can’t get a good enough look at a 
target’s face, Progeny has other ways of IDing its prey 
. . . digital stereotyping using a series of so-called 
‘soft biometrics’—everything from age to gender to 
“ethnicity” to “skin color” to height and weight—the 
system can keep track of targets “at ranges that are 
impossible to do with facial recognition.”69 
The biometric data technology is not limited to surveillance in 
the small data sense—for example, watching an adversary. Through 
the pre-crime identification ambitions of big data, the defense 
contracts also reveal that the government aims to identify potentially 
hostile behaviors and uncover clandestine threats using a tool 
referred to as Adversary Behavior Acquisition, Collection, 
 
 66. See id. at 128 (detailing how in biometric cybersurveillance systems, “the inquiry 
expands from simply verification of identity . . . to include determination of identity 
. . . , as well as intent-related assessments”). 
 67. Noah Shachtman, Army Tracking Plan: Drones That Never Forget a Face, WIRED 
(Sept. 28, 2011), https://www.wired.com/2011/09/drones-never-forget-a-face/ 
[https://perma.cc/2HVN-Z9UW]. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
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Understanding, and Summarization (“ABACUS”).70 The technology 
would aggregate biometric data garnered from intercepted phone 
calls, social media and, potentially, body-camera footage and feed this 
information into a “human behavior modeling and simulation engine” 
that would generate “intent-based threat assessments of individuals 
and groups.”71 Put simply, ABACUS could potentially make a 
prediction as to which individuals are the most likely to commit acts 
of terrorism. 
The qualitative distinction between this type of biometric data 
and the type of data derived from bulk telephony metadata collection 
as disclosed by Snowden is what makes technologies such as 
predictive policing so concerning from a privacy perspective. Whereas 
bulk telephony metadata collection programs return markers such as 
date, time, and location, facial recognition software platforms use 
images to identify certain points of an individual’s facial symmetry 
and then discard the physical picture—retaining only the unique, 
identifying “map” of facial coordinates to be aggregated into a 
database.72 
When migrated from foreign intelligence use or military use to 
domestic law enforcement uses, the current legislative and 
constitutional framework for regulating such technology appears to 
be absent.73 Thus, the government may perceive that it is free to 
implement this technology in a legal vacuum. Similar to the lack of 
legal restraint on bulk telephony metadata collection prior to the 
Snowden disclosures, there is currently a lack of legal restraint on the 
scope and potential applications of bulk biometric data collection 
initiatives.74 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See, e.g., Margaret Hu, Biometric Cyberintelligence and the Posse Comitatus Act, 
66 EMORY L.J. 697, 711–12 (2017). 
 74. But see Ted Claypoole & Cameron Stoll, Developing Laws Address Flourishing 
Commercial Use of Biometric Information, AM. BAR ASS’N (May 2016), 
https://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2016/05/08_claypoole.html [https://perma.cc
/82XE-FDJE] (describing, inter alia, efforts by states—including Alaska, Arizona, 
California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Missouri, New 
Hampshire, North Carolina, Texas, West Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin—to 
“regulate third parties’ use and collection of individuals’ biometric information”); see, e.g., 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 260:10-b (West, Westlaw through Chapter 7 of the 2018 Reg. 
Sess.) (prohibiting collection of biometric data in connection with driver licensing). 
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C. Cooperative Biometric Data Sharing Between Privatized and State 
Law Enforcement and the Federal Government 
Once biometric data (e.g., digital photo, scanned fingerprint. iris 
scan, or DNA) and biometric metadata (e.g., data associated with the 
biometric template) is collected and stored in bulk, bulk biometric 
metadata surveillance can be shared across entities—data can be 
shared between state and local law enforcement and the federal 
government; between the government and private contractors; and 
between civilian agencies and the intelligence and military 
communities.75 For example, after the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”), the DHS, and 
other federal agencies encouraged cooperative data sharing as an 
effective counterterrorism tool.76 Through programs such as Secure 
Communities, coordinated by DHS, state and local law enforcement 
organizations are required to share biometric data—digitally scanned 
fingerprints—with DHS.77 Specifically, the biometric data is screened 
through DHS and FBI databases to determine if an arrestee is an 
undocumented immigrant and to facilitate digital watchlisting.78 
Body cameras, once ubiquitous and multi-dimensional in their 
cybersurveillance capacities, can be used to facilitate cooperative data 
sharing between privatized law enforcement entities, state and local 
 
 75. See Claypoole & Stoll, supra note 74. 
 76. See, e.g., Margaret Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1735, 1778–92 
(2015) (describing anti-terrorism programs that facilitate state and local law enforcement 
data sharing with federal government); Nathan Alexander Sales, Mending Walls: 
Information Sharing After the USA PATRIOT Act, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1795, 1797 (2010); 
Press Release, Transp. Sec. Admin., TSA to Test New Passenger Pre-Screening System 
(Aug. 26, 2004), http://www.tsa.gov/press/releases/2004/08/26/tsa-test-new-passenger-pre-
screening-system [https://perma.cc/8RRW-8L9P] (announcing the “Secure Flight” 
program, a post-9/11 prescreening program that compares passenger lists with terrorist 
watchlists to assist in maintaining “no fly” lists). 
 77. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, 80 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 87, 110–34 (2013); Christopher N. Lasch, Rendition Resistance, 92 N.C. L. REV. 149, 
209–16 (2013); Thomas J. Miles & Adam B. Cox, Does Immigration Enforcement Reduce 
Crime? Evidence from Secure Communities, 57 J. L. & ECON. 937, 938–39 (2014). 
 78. DHS explains that Secured Communities is justified by a combination of 
authorities. See Memorandum from Riah Ramlogan, Deputy Principal Legal Advisor, to 
Beth N. Gibson, Assistant Deputy Dir., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., U.S. Immigration & 
Customs Enforcement 1 (Oct. 2, 2010), http://uncoverthetruth.org/wp-content/uploads
/2012/01/Mandatory-in-2013-Memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4DU-B5A6]. DHS relied upon 
the following: (1) 28 U.S.C. § 534(a)(1) (2012) and 28 U.S.C. § 534(a)(4) together 
provide the FBI with authority to share fingerprint data with ICE/DHS; (2) 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1722 mandates the development of a data sharing system that “enable(s) intelligence 
and law enforcement agencies to determine the inadmissibility or deportability of an 
[undocumented immigrant]”; and (3) 42 U.S.C. § 14616 ratifies information or database 
sharing between federal and state agencies. Id. at 4–6. 
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law enforcement, and the federal government. Secure Communities 
provides a concrete example of how the data collected by state and 
local law enforcement through body cameras may one day be placed 
into the service of federal database screening and digital watchlisting 
systems. Additionally, the bulk biometric collection program revealed 
by the Snowden disclosures indicated that in one NSA PowerPoint 
slide, a facial image of “an unidentified man” included “more than 
two dozen data points” that included “whether he was on the 
Transportation Security Administration no-fly list, his passport and 
visa status, known associates or suspected terrorist ties, and 
comments made about him by informants.”79 
Reporting on surveillance practices has helped to reveal 
domestic law enforcement’s ever-increasing ability to use biometric 
surveillance, thanks to multi-dimensional cybersurveillance tools. For 
example, media reports have revealed that state and local 
enforcement have partnered with corporations to experiment with 
biometric surveillance that relies upon live-feed video surveillance 
and real-time social media screening.80 In some instances the law 
enforcement agency solicits a corporate surveillance product and in 
other instances the corporation may solicit a collaboration with the 
state or local law enforcement organization.81 In one program, for 
example, a corporation tested a Smart Surveillance System and 
Intelligent Video Analytics software with cooperation with a city to 
conduct surveillance of a concert.82 The program assimilated and 
aggregated information on live video and social media activity 
through monitoring of crowds, pedestrians, and vehicles.83 The 
“situational awareness software” was defined as 
 
 79. Risen & Poitras, supra note 41. 
 80. See Luke O’Neil, Beantown’s Big Brother: How Boston Police Used Facial 
Recognition Technology to Spy on Thousands of Music Festival Attendees, NOISEY (Aug. 
13, 2014, 12:00PM), https://noisey.vice.com/en_us/article/beantowns-big-brother 
[https://perma.cc/DXB6-WKY7]. 
 81. In one media disclosure, for example, it was revealed that IBM and the city of 
Boston had collaborated on a situational awareness system since March of 2012, when 
IBM gave Boston a grant through its “Smarter Cities Challenge.” Chris Faraone, Kenneth 
Lipp & Jonathan Riley, Boston Trolling (Part 2), DIGBOSTON (Oct. 9, 2014), 
https://digboston.com/boston-trolling-part-2/#sthash.fdmnpZxN.dpbs [https://perma.cc
/LH3C-FG6X]. 
 82. Chris Faraone, Kenneth Lipp & Jonathan Riley, Boston Trolling (Part I): You 
Partied Hard at Boston Calling and There’s Facial Recognition Data to Prove It, 
DIGBOSTON (Aug. 7, 2014), https://web.archive.org/web/20140924133220
/https://digboston.com/boston-news-opinions/2014/08/boston-trolling-part-i-you-partied-
hard-at-boston-calling-and-theres-facial-recognition-data-to-prove-it/ [https://perma.cc
/4NHM-8SFM]. 
 83. Id. 
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software [that] analyzes video and provides alerts when 
something happens. For example, if someone walks into a 
secure area in view of one of the system’s cameras, the software 
would raise a red flag. More sophisticated systems can track 
people in real time as they move through crowds — such as 
following an unauthorized person in the area — without 
requiring dozens or even hundreds of human analysts to watch 
video feeds.84 
In practice, the situational awareness tool integrated live social 
media tracking into already-installed city cameras to screen 
individuals for biometric tracking and “forensic identification 
purposes.”85 Notably, the surveillance had a “People Search” feature 
that could identify individuals by skin color, clothing texture, 
baldness, or whether or not they wear glasses.86 Although the 
program claimed that there was no use of the facial capture and facial 
recognition technology,87 the program possessed the capacity to 
conduct such tracking.88 These situational awareness programs show 
the significant increase in the real time technological capabilities of 
using biometric capture and recognition software. However, the 
programs remain highly experimental, with their efficacy and 
accuracy unknown.89 
 Consequently, these technologically evolving surveillance 
programs are not necessarily carried out by traditional law 
enforcement. Rather, state and local law enforcement are increasingly 
relying upon corporate and federal situational-awareness surveillance 
products. Multidimensional cybersurveillance tools are expanding in 
their purported capacities to assess risk. With evolving technologies, 
like body cameras, state and local officers could receive real-time 
alerts and information from corporate and federal surveillance 
products that may scrape social media, for instance, permitting the 
 
 84. Nestor Ramos, City Used High-Tech Tracking Software at ‘13 Boston Calling, 
BOS. GLOBE (Sept. 8, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/09/07/boston-
watching-city-acknowledges-surveillance-tests-during-festivals/Sz9QVurQ5VnA4a6Btds8xH
/story.html [https://perma.cc/4CXY-EPDX]. 
 85. Faraone et al., supra note 81. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. (noting that despite those claims, photographs from the IOC obtained and 
published by reporters appeared to show Boston Police Officers present during the IOC 
test during the event). 
 88. Ramos, supra note 84. 
 89. See Tim De Chant, The Limits of Facial Recognition, NOVANEXT (Apr. 26, 2013), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/next/tech/the-limits-of-facial-recognition/ [https://perma.cc
/QXM9-XWU4]. 
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officers to respond to ongoing situations.90 Body-camera technology 
could one day allow law enforcement to sort through social media 
photos with facial recognition technology to compile biometric and 
biographic profiles of anyone who presents their face in public, for 
instance, in a crowd or in a vehicle.91 
Data generated by ubiquitous body cameras could be captured 
and monetized by corporations as pre-crime intervention products. 
The dual purpose and symbiotic relationship of body-camera 
surveillance and corporate data surveillance might operate in the 
following manner: Law enforcement investigative and monitoring 
techniques could be converted into more accurate consumer 
monitoring, and the consumer monitoring and trend tracking could 
have the potential to be exploited for law enforcement investigation. 
Therefore, these growing capacities to conduct situational-awareness 
surveillance or multi-dimensional cybersurveillance show how law 
enforcement, homeland security, and intelligence and military 
communities could use body-camera data and corporate-delegated 
surveillance to engage in comprehensive monitoring and biometric-
behavioral profiling. 
II.  BULK TELEPHONY METADATA COLLECTION 
As the following discussion in Parts II and III illuminates, the 
statutory framework necessary to regulate data sharing, both within 
the intelligence community writ large and between federal and state 
and local law enforcement, is lacking. The degradation of federalism 
in the law enforcement context will likely exacerbate the legal 
challenges associated with the large-scale installation of police body 
cameras. As body-camera data becomes more available, the federal 
government, particularly DHS, may attempt to commandeer the real-
 
 90. See Andy Cush, Social Media Surveillance Probably Played a Role in Sparking the 
Freddie Gray Riot, SPIN (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.spin.com/2016/10/social-media-
surveillance-probably-played-a-role-in-sparking-the-freddie-gray-riot/ [https://perma.cc
/MEF8-CAQG] (explaining how Geofeedia monitored protests and alerted Baltimore 
officers to high school students who “planned to walk out of class and use mass transit to 
head to the Mondawmin Mall protests,” allowing officers to intercept the students before 
they arrived at a protest).  
 91. Id.; see, e.g., Romine Testimony, supra note 7, at 21 (“The latest FRVT [NIST 
Face Recognition Vendor Testing Program] (launched July 2012) evaluated large-scale 
one-to-many face recognition algorithms from still face photos and (for the first time) 
from video, along with testing automated methods for detecting pose, expression, and 
gender.”); Brian Shockley, Vigilant Solutions Unveils Mobile Companion App at IACP, 
VIGILANT SOLUTIONS (Oct. 23, 2014), https://www.vigilantsolutions.com/stories-from-the-
street/vigilant-mobile-companion-app-iacp [https://perma.cc/2Z6P-PCU9] (describing 
systems that combine facial recognition technology with automated license plate readers). 
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time biometric data stream from local law enforcement. Once DHS 
and other federal agencies, including intelligence and military 
organizations, gain unfettered access to an exponentially larger 
amount of body-camera data, such data can then be compiled into 
databases to be aggregated, shared, and applied to a wide range of 
pre-crime surveillance uses. 
The Snowden disclosures suggest that metadata collection and 
database queries of stored metadata are not characterized as 
surveillance activities by the NSA.92 The bulk telephony metadata 
program revealed by the Snowden disclosures did not include an 
analysis of “content”—i.e., an examination of the conversation or 
review of the substantive information shared in the phone call—
because this distinction was legally significant to the intelligence 
community and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”) 
in distinguishing between a “collection” program and a “surveillance” 
program.93 The Snowden disclosures, importantly, revealed that by 
discounting the surveillance implications of bulk metadata collection 
and database queries, the intelligence community argued, and the 
FISC agreed, that Fourth Amendment protections were inapplicable 
to metadata surveillance.94 
Properly regulating bulk metadata collection by the NSA thus is 
complicated significantly by the fact that bulk metadata surveillance 
technically does not fall within the category of “content” 
 
 92. Because Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act allows for the collection of 
business records, it appears that the bulk telephony metadata program was characterized 
by the government as a business records collection program, not as a metadata 
surveillance program. Pub. L. No. 107-56, sec. 215, § 501, 115 Stat. 272, 287–88 (2001) 
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012)); see, e.g., Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. 
Supp. 2d 1, 14 (D.D.C. 2013) (“In broad overview, the Government has developed a 
‘counterterrorism program’ under [Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, codified in the 
U.S. Code at] Section 1861 in which it collect[s], compiles, retains, and analyzes certain 
telephone records, which it characterizes as ‘business records’ created by certain 
telecommunications companies (the ‘Bulk Telephony Metadata Program’). The records 
collected under this program consist of ‘metadata,’ such as information about what phone 
numbers were used to make and receive calls, when the calls took place, and how long the 
calls lasted.” (citations omitted)), rev’d on other grounds, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015); In 
re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from 
[Redacted], No. BR 06-05, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101368, at *2 (FISA Ct. May 24, 2006) 
(describing information collected as “session identifying information,” including “trunk 
identifier” and “time and duration of call.”). 
 93. See MacAskill, supra note 36. See generally GRANICK, supra note 36 (detailing the 
history of the policy and legal debate on modern surveillance and arguing that modern 
surveillance and democracy are incompatible). 
 94. See MacAskill, supra note 36. 
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surveillance.95 Historically, the intelligence community utilized 
traditional surveillance methods to probe the content of the 
communication intercepted—for instance, the content of a phone call 
(e.g., the conversation) or the content of a written correspondence 
(e.g., text of the letter, telegram, or an email).96 Traditional small data 
intelligence gathering methods have relied upon human intelligence, 
including: sensory perception analysis and other communication 
gathering and analytic methods that depended upon human judgment 
and decision-making; traditional evidence based upon analog data 
and paper-based files; conventional intelligence collection methods, 
such as traditional signals intelligence and other traditional 
communications interception; and other data analytic tools that have 
centered upon traditional research approaches, such as hypothesis-
driven methods.97 
 
 95. See Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 15 (“According to the representations made by 
the Government, the metadata records collected under the program do not include any 
information about the content of those calls, or the names, addresses, or financial 
information of any party to the calls. Through targeted computerized searches of those 
metadata records, the NSA tries to discern connections between terrorist organizations 
and previously unknown terrorist operatives located in the United States.” (footnote and 
citations omitted)); In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of 
Tangible Things from [Redacted], 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101368, at *2 (“Telephony 
metadata does not include the substantive content of any communication . . . , or the 
name, address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer.”). 
 96. See generally ROBERT M. CLARK, INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION (2014) 
(explaining methods of intercepting phone calls and written correspondence); ROBERT 
WALLACE, H. KEITH MELTON, & HENRY R. SCHLESINGER, SPYCRAFT: THE SECRET 
HISTORY OF THE CIA’S SPYTECHS, FROM COMMUNISM TO AL-QAEDA (2008) 
(recounting the history of the CIA and explaining methods used by the agency to conduct 
intelligence operations). Multiple scholars have discussed the Fourth Amendment 
implications of rapidly evolving technologies. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, MORE 
ESSENTIAL THAN EVER: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
115–43 (2012); David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A Shattered Looking Glass: The 
Pitfalls and Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. & 
TECH. 381, 385–91 (2013); Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 311, 313–14 (2012); Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the 
Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 481–82 (2011); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth 
Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 801, 802–05 (2004); Benjamin Wittes, Databuse: Digital Privacy and the 
Mosaic, BROOKINGS INST. JUST. (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers
/2011/04/01-databuse-wittes [https://perma.cc/4988-KSA3]. Other scholars have explained 
necessary statutory reforms needed to keep pace with these technological developments. 
See, e.g., Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection, supra note 23, at 900; Donohue, Section 702, 
supra note 23, at 265; Margulies, supra note 23, at 5; Christopher Slobogin, Making the 
Most of United States v. Jones in a Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of 
Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 17–34 (2012). 
 97. See Faraone et al., supra note 81. 
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Because metadata collection technically does not include 
content—for example, collection of metadata includes the time of call 
and location of call, but does not include eavesdropping on the 
conversation—the privacy concerns associated with its collection are 
often underestimated.98 For instance, shortly after the Snowden 
disclosures, Senator Dianne Feinstein, then Chair of the Senate 
Intelligence Committee, explained that metadata collection is not 
surveillance in that it is pure “content-less” data.99 In contrast, Bruce 
Schneier, a renowned cybersecurity expert, has stated unequivocally 
that bulk metadata collection is coterminous with modern 
surveillance—an equivalency that potentially implicates significant 
privacy concerns.100 
Consequently, even with passage of the USA FREEDOM Act, 
metadata surveillance by the intelligence community is significantly 
under-regulated.101 At the dawn of the big data revolution, the U.S. 
political branches and U.S. federal courts appear to be conflicted 
about how to treat metadata collection under preexisting intelligence 
governance structures and the U.S. Constitution.102 Some have argued 
 
 98. See ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 794 (2d Cir. 2015) (“That telephone metadata 
do not directly reveal the content of telephone calls . . . does not vitiate the privacy 
concerns arising out of the government’s bulk collection of such data.”). 
 99. Ed O’Keefe, Transcript: Dianne Feinstein, Saxby Chambliss Explain, Defend NSA 
Phone Records Program, WASH. POST (June 6, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/post-politics/wp/2013/06/06/transcript-dianne-feinstein-saxby-chambliss-explain-defend
-nsa-phone-records-program/ [https://perma.cc/2HYJ-RMKF]. Senator Feinstein defended 
the NSA bulk telephony metadata collection program in the following way: “[T]his is just 
metadata. There is no content involved.” Id. 
 100. Bruce Schneier, Metadata = Surveillance, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Mar. 13, 2014, 
12:13 PM), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/03/metadata_survei.html 
[https://perma.cc/AP3T-NSQ2] (“Metadata equals surveillance data, and collecting 
metadata on people means putting them under surveillance.”). 
 101. See David Cole, Here’s What’s Wrong with the USA FREEDOM Act, NATION 
(May 6, 2015), http://www.thenation.com/article/heres-whats-wrong-usa-freedom-act/ 
[https://perma.cc/6XPR-963Y]; Dan Froomkin, USA FREEDOM Act: Small Step for Post-
Snowden Reform, Giant Leap for Congress, INTERCEPT (June 2, 2015, 6:08 PM), 
https://theintercept.com/2015/06/02/one-small-step-toward-post-snowden-surveillance-reform
-one-giant-step-congress/ [https://perma.cc/RZD4-4FW6]; see also Banks, supra note 23, at 
1636; Peter P. Swire, Privacy and Information Sharing in the War on Terrorism, 51 VILL. L. 
REV. 951, 954 (2006). 
 102. The bulk telephony metadata collection program, as had been legally justified 
under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, faced multiple legal challenges under 
several legal theories, with lawsuits filed in federal court immediately following the June 5, 
2013 Snowden disclosures. See, e.g., Klayman v. Obama, 142 F. Supp. 3d 172, 182–195 
(D.D.C. 2015) (concluding that plaintiff’s claim that Section 215 program is 
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment has a likelihood of success on the merits 
and ordering injunction, blocking the final weeks of the Section 215 program prior to the 
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act’s reforms to metadata collection), stay 
granted sub nom, Obama v. Klayman, 1:13-cv-00851-RJL, 2015 WL 9010330 (D.C. Cir. 
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that metadata collection should not fall within traditional conceptions 
of what is considered surveillance and, therefore, should not be 
regulated in the same manner as traditional surveillance methods.103 
Some in the government have explicitly drawn a distinction 
between content and non-content surveillance to explain how the 
latter falls outside the scope of many of the legal restrictions and 
other regulatory constraints imposed on the surveillance activities of 
the intelligence community.104 In contrast, some contend that the 
pervasive, comprehensive, and automated or semi-automated nature 
of bulk metadata surveillance leads to greater harms than the types of 
harms enabled by traditional content surveillance.105 Experts, for 
 
Nov. 16, 2015), petition for rehearing en banc denied, 805 F.3d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(mem.); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 19, 30 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding court lacked 
jurisdiction to review Administrative Procedures Act [APA] claim but could hear Fourth 
Amendment constitutional challenges to NSA’s conduct; and granting motion for 
injunction, however, staying the order pending appeal), rev’d sub nom and remanded, 
Obama v. Klayman, 800 F.3d. 559, 561 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see also ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. 
Supp. 2d 724, 757 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (dismissing complaint in part on grounds that 
subscribers do not have legitimate expectation of privacy in telephony metadata held by 
third parties under Fourth Amendment), vacated, 785 F.3d. 787, 792 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(finding that bulk collection of telephone metadata exceeded scope of statutory authority, 
remanding for argument on constitutional issues, and affirming district court’s denial of 
preliminary injunction), stay ordered, 2015 WL 4196833 (2d Cir. June 9, 2015) (ordering 
stay of proceedings pending parties’ supplemental briefing in light of passage of USA 
FREEDOM Act), remanded, 804 F.3d 617 (2d Cir. 2015) (denying motion for preliminary 
injunction, declining to reach constitutional issues for prudential reasons); Margaret Hu, 
Small Data Surveillance v. Big Data Cybersurveillance, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 773, 809–10 
(2015). 
 103. See, e.g., O’Keefe, supra note 99 (statements of Sens. Dianne Feinstein and Saxby 
Chambliss). 
 104. See In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible 
Things from [Redacted], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *5 n.18 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 
2013) (“In In re Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2703(d), the court found that only the service provider, as opposed to a customer or 
subscriber, could challenge the execution of a § 2703(d) non-content records order. The 
court reasoned that ‘[b]ecause Congress clearly provided . . . protections for one type of 
§ 2703 order [content] but not for others, the Court must infer that Congress deliberately 
declined to permit challenges for the omitted orders.’ The court also noted that the 
distinction between content and non-content demonstrates an incorporation of Smith v. 
Maryland into the SCA. As discussed above, the operation of Section 215 within FISA 
represents that same distinction.” (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting In 
re Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), 830 F. 
Supp. 2d 114, 128 (E.D. Va. 2011))). 
 105. See, e.g., Clapper, 785 F.3d at 794 (“[A] call to a single-purpose telephone number 
such as a “hotline” might reveal that an individual is: a victim of domestic violence or rape; 
a veteran; suffering from an addiction of one type or another; contemplating suicide; or 
reporting a crime. Metadata can reveal civil, political, or religious affiliations; they can also 
reveal an individual’s social status, or whether and when he or she is involved in intimate 
relationships. . . . The more metadata the government collects and analyzes, . . . the 
greater the capacity for such metadata to reveal ever more private and previously 
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example, have explained that metadata collection is and should be 
regulated as a new form of surveillance in that it is even more 
intrusive than traditional intelligence-gathering methods and can 
reveal a “startling amount of detailed information”106 in the aggregate 
that content surveillance standing alone is incapable of revealing. 
Grasping the legal and technological distinctions between 
“content” surveillance and “non-content” surveillance in the eyes of 
the intelligence community and the FISC underscores why metadata 
surveillance appears to be justified by those within the NSA and the 
intelligence community. The USA FREEDOM Act does not resolve 
the tension between “content” surveillance and “non-content” 
surveillance. Therefore, even after passage of the USA FREEDOM 
Act, there is still an open debate regarding whether “non-content” 
surveillance such as bulk metadata surveillance should fall within the 
same oversight and accountability mechanisms that constrain 
“content” surveillance. Without a resolution of this tension, bulk 
metadata surveillance is likely to continue without proper oversight 
and constraint. 
A. The NSA’s Bulk Telephony Metadata Collection Program Under 
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act 
Much of what we know about the NSA’s bulk metadata 
collection program stems from documents released through the 
Snowden disclosures.107 In June 2013, the disclosures by former NSA 
contractor Edward Snowden revealed that the U.S. intelligence 
organization had collected the bulk telephony metadata on every call 
generated by customers of the multinational telecommunications 
company, Verizon, on a daily basis over the course of the past seven 
years.108 Approved through a classified order by the FISC, the bulk 
metadata collected by the NSA included the time of the call and the 
 
unascertainable information about individuals.”); see also Declaration of Professor 
Edward W. Felten at 20, Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (No. 13 Civ. 3994(WHP)) 
(“Metadata analysis can reveal the rise and fall of intimate relationships, the diagnosis of a 
life-threatening disease, the telltale signs of a corporate merger or acquisition, the identity 
of a prospective government whistleblower, the social dynamics of a group of associates, 
or even the name of an anonymous litigant.”). 
 106. Clapper, 785 F.3d at 794. 
 107. The Snowden disclosures were first revealed by journalist Glenn Greenwald in 
June 2013. For an extensive historical account of the Snowden disclosures, see generally 
GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE: EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE NSA, AND THE 
U.S. SURVEILLANCE STATE (2014). 
 108. See Greenwald, supra note 17. 
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length of the call.109 The NSA’s bulk telephony metadata collection 
program also included: comprehensive communications routing 
information; the international mobile subscriber identity number; the 
trunk identifier; telephone calling card numbers; and other 
metadata.110 Whether the geolocation of the call was included in this 
bulk collection program is disputed.111 
In the litigation that followed the Snowden disclosures, it 
remains judicially unresolved whether metadata collection is either 
statutorily or constitutionally permissible.112 Further complicating the 
adjudication of these matters, the FISC had adopted the NSA’s view 
and held in 2006 that the prior bulk telephony metadata collection 
program was justified under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT 
Act.113 In the post-Snowden litigation, federal courts have grappled 
 
 109. In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things 
from [Redacted], No. BR 06-05, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101368, at *1–2 (FISA Ct. May 24, 
2006) (“[Here] ‘telephony metadata’ includes comprehensive communications routing 
information, including but not limited to session identifying information (e.g., originating 
and terminating telephone number, International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) 
number, International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, etc.), trunk 
identifier, telephone calling card numbers, and time and duration of call.”); see also 
Greenwald, supra note 17. 
 110. See Amici Curiae Brief of Experts in Computer and Data Science in Support of 
Appellants and Reversal at 7, Clapper, 785 F.3d 787 (No. 14-42) (citing In re Application 
of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from [Redacted], 2013 
WL 5741573, at *1 n.2 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013)). 
 111. See Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15 n.17 (D.D.C. 2013) (“Plaintiffs have 
alleged that the Government has collected location information for cell phones. While 
more recent FISC opinions expressly state that cell-site location information is not 
covered by Section 1861 production orders, the Government has not affirmatively 
represented to this Court that the NSA has not, at any point in the history of the Bulk 
Telephony Metadata Program, collected location information (in one technical format or 
another) about cell phones.” (citations omitted)), rev’d on other grounds, 800 F.3d 559 
(D.C. Cir. 2015); see also Amici Curiae Brief of Experts in Computer and Data Science in 
Support of Appellants and Reversal, supra note 110, at 7 (claiming that a trunk identifier 
provides “revealing general information about [a] part[y’s] location”). 
 112. See e.g., Clapper, 785 F.3d at 792 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding that “the program 
exceed[ed] the scope of what Congress has authorized” under the USA PATRIOT Act); 
Obama, 800 F.3d. at 568 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (finding “that plaintiffs have failed to 
demonstrate a ‘substantial likelihood’ that the government is collecting from Verizon 
Wireless or that they are otherwise suffering any cognizable injury”). Compare Klayman, 
957 F. Supp. 2d at 41 (holding that, for purposes of injunctive relief, plaintiff subscribers 
had “a substantial likelihood of showing that . . . the NSA’s bulk collection program is 
indeed an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment”), with United States v. 
Moalin, No. 10cr4246 JM, 2013 WL 6079518, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2013) (holding that 
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in telephony metadata under the Fourth 
Amendment), and In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of 
Tangible Things from [Redacted], 2013 WL 5741573, at *2–3 (same). 
 113. See, e.g., In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible 
Things from [Redacted], 2013 WL 5741573, at *4–6; see also In re Application of the FBI 
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with the question of whether bulk telephony metadata could be 
permissibly construed under the statute as a “tangible” business 
record “relevant to any particular investigation,” as had been the 
government’s interpretation of Section 215.114 
According to the government, the statutory basis for bulk 
telephony metadata collection expressly derives from Section 215 of 
the USA PATRIOT Act, which authorizes the following collection: 
“any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, 
and other items).”115 Under the USA PATRIOT Act, “the Director 
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or a designee of the Director 
(whose rank shall be no lower than Assistant Special Agent in 
Charge) may make an application for an order requiring the 
production of any tangible things.”116 These “tangible things,” 
however, must be “relevant to an authorized investigation . . . to 
obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United 
States person or to protect against international terrorism or 
clandestine intelligence activities.”117 Snowden’s disclosures revealed 
that the government had successfully argued in the FISC that bulk 
collection of data was necessary ex ante under Section 215 of the 
USA PATRIOT Act.118 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit found that the district court had erred in granting a 
preliminary injunction barring the government from collecting bulk 
telephony metadata under Section 215 of the Act because any lapse 
in bulk collection was temporary where the FISC viewed the Act as 
effectively reinstating Section 215 for 180 days and allowing it to 
resume issuing bulk collection orders during that window.119 The bulk 
telephony metadata program provides the government with an 
aggregate of data (e.g., metadata on all phone calls collected from 
Verizon on a daily basis, which allows the NSA to collect the “phone 
records of millions of Verizon customers daily”).120 Once the bulk 
 
for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from [Redacted], 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 101368, at *3 (granting the NSA’s application to collect bulk telephony metadata). 
 114. See, e.g., Clapper, 785 F.3d at 810–11.  
 115. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, sec. 215, § 501(a)(1), 115 Stat. 
272, 287 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1) (2012)). 
 116. Id.  
 117. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
 118. See, e.g., Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2013), rev’d on other 
grounds, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015); In re Application of the FBI for an Order 
Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from Verizon Bus. Network Servs., Inc., No. BR 
13-80, at 1–2 (FISA Ct. Apr. 25, 2013), https://epic.org/privacy/nsa/Section-215-Order-to-
Verizon.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KB6-FX45]. 
 119. Obama v. Klayman, 800 F.3d. 559, 561–62 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 120. Greenwald, supra note 17. 
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data is amassed, the NSA may query a specific identifier within the 
aggregated database and determine the relevance of the data to an 
ongoing investigation.121 
In challenges filed immediately after the Snowden disclosures, 
federal courts attempted to resolve whether the NSA’s bulk 
telephony metadata collection program was consistent with 
constitutional protections such as the First Amendment’s 
associational and expressive freedom guarantees, and the Fourth 
Amendment’s proscription against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.122 The issue of whether the Act constitutionally resolves 
metadata surveillance remains unclear.123 As discussed below, federal 
courts in the post-Snowden litigation appear reluctant to reach the 
question of whether bulk telephony metadata collection is 
constitutional under the First Amendment and the Fourth 
Amendment.124 
 
 121. “After collecting these telephone records, the NSA stores them in a centralized 
database. Initially, NSA analysts are permitted to access the Section 215 calling records 
only through ‘queries’ of the database. A query is a search for a specific number or other 
selection term within the database.” PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., supra 
note 39, at 8; see also Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 15 (“According to Government officials, 
this aggregation of records into a single database creates ‘an historical repository that 
permits retrospective analysis,’ Govt.’s Opp’n at 12, enabling NSA analysts to draw 
connections, across telecommunications service providers, between numbers reasonably 
suspected to be associated with terrorist activity and with other, unknown numbers.”); In 
re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from 
[Redacted], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *6–7 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013); 
Christopher Slobogin, Cause To Believe What? The Importance of Defining a Search’s 
Object—Or, How the ABA Would Analyze the NSA Metadata Surveillance Program, 66 
OKLA. L. REV. 725, 737 (2014) (“But at the time of the bulk collection, those links would 
not be known; the NSA would subsequently have to query the data to learn about those 
links. Thus, one would be hard pressed to say that, at the time of the bulk collection, the 
government meets the relevance standard, much less the probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion standards, if the object of the seizure is Redding’s [Safford Unified School 
District #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 370 (2009)] ‘evidence of criminal activity’ or the 
LEATPR [American Bar Association’s Criminal Justice Standards on Law Enforcement 
Access to Third Party Records] Standards ‘evidence of crime’ that is associated with the 
probable cause and reasonable suspicion standards.”). 
 122. See, e.g., Klayman v. Obama, 142 F. Supp. 3d 172, 183, 189 (D.D.C. 2015) (finding 
that plaintiffs had demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on Fourth Amendment 
claim collection and querying of bulk telephony metadata records constituted an 
unconstitutional search). 
 123. See id. at 178 (granting preliminary injunction to enjoin “the future collection and 
querying of [plaintiffs’] telephone record metadata” on basis that Section 215 program is 
unconstitutional); vacated by Klayman v. Obama, 805 F.3d 1148, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2015); 
Motion to Vacate Preliminary Injunction and Dismiss Appeal on Grounds of Mootness, 
Klayman v. Obama, 15-5307 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 4, 2016) (filing motion to dismiss matter as 
moot in light of enactment and implementation of USA FREEDOM Act). 
 124. See infra Section II.B. 
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B. Post-Snowden Legislative Reform: The USA FREEDOM Act 
The most developed litigation challenging the legality and 
constitutionality of the NSA’s bulk telephony metadata collection 
program is represented by two cases: ACLU v. Clapper125 and 
Klayman v. Obama.126 Both of these challenges to the Section 215 
bulk metadata collection program in federal court were brought days 
after the Snowden disclosures first came to light in June 2013.127 U.S. 
District Court Judge William H. Pauley III for the Southern District 
of New York, in ACLU v. Clapper, and U.S. District Court Judge 
Richard Leon for the District of Columbia, in Klayman v. Obama, 
considered the same program—NSA’s bulk telephony metadata 
collection program—and reached entirely different results in their 
considerations of injunctive relief for their plaintiffs.128 In both 
Clapper and Klayman, the plaintiffs asserted a combination of 
statutory and constitutional claims129 to challenge the bulk telephony 
metadata program that derived from a April 25, 2013 FISC order 
compelling Verizon Business Network Services to produce to the 
NSA on “an ongoing daily basis . . . all call detail records or 
‘telephony metadata’ created by Verizon for communications (i) 
between the United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly within the 
United States, including local telephone calls,” pursuant to Section 
215 of the USA PATRIOT Act.130 
 
 125. 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (dismissing complaint in part on grounds that 
subscribers do not have legitimate expectation of privacy in telephony metadata held by 
third parties under Fourth Amendment precedent), vacated, 785 F.3d. 787 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 126. 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding that court lacked jurisdiction to review 
Administrative Procedure Act [“APA”] claim but could hear Fourth Amendment 
constitutional challenges to NSA’s conduct, and granting motion for injunction, however, 
staying the order pending appeal). 
 127. See supra notes 111–13 For a detailed history of the Snowden disclosures, see 
generally GREENWALD, supra note 107. 
 128. Compare Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 9–10 (granting, in part, a preliminary 
injunction on Fourth Amendment grounds, but staying the order pending appeal), with 
Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 742, 752, 757 (denying injunctive relief after holding the 
metadata collection was authorized by the statute and that the metadata collection did not 
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment). 
 129. See, e.g., Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 11 (“Specifically, plaintiffs allege that the 
Government has violated their individual rights under the First, Fourth, and Fifth 
Amendments of the Constitution and has violated the Administrative Procedure Act 
(‘APA’) by exceeding its statutory authority under FISA.”). 
 130. See id. at 10 (quoting In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the 
Prod. of Tangible Things from Verizon Bus. Network Servs., Inc. on Behalf of MCI 
Commc’n Servs., Inc. d/b/a Verizon Bus. Servs., No. BR 13–80 at 2 (FISA Ct. Apr. 25, 
2013)); see also In re Application No. BR 06-05, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101368, at *1–2 
(FISA Ct. May 24, 2006). The FISC would reauthorize this program every ninety days 
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On June 2, 2015, the U.S. Congress passed new legislation, the 
USA FREEDOM Act, intended to help resolve the legal dispute and 
to bring the NSA’s bulk telephony metadata collection program 
under tighter regulation.131 Proponents of the USA FREEDOM Act 
contend that the new law corrects the primary statutory and 
constitutional deficiencies of the bulk metadata collection program 
under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act.132 The law was passed 
two years after the Snowden disclosures and less than four weeks 
after the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined in 
Clapper that the NSA had exceeded the scope of its statutory 
authority in impermissibly reading Section 215 to include bulk 
telephony metadata collection.133  
Specifically, the USA FREEDOM Act requires the government 
to seek from the FISC orders for metadata records directly held by 
companies after identifying a specific person, account, address, or 
other specific identifier as a subject of a specific investigation.134  
If the order is granted, the telecommunications provider or other 
corporate provider must produce the metadata records pursuant to a 
specific investigation.135 In particular, the Act seeks to end the prior 
 
following the original authorization which was granted in 2006. See Slobogin, supra note 
23, at 1757. 
 131. See supra notes 11–12. 
 132. See, e.g., Presidential Statement on Congressional Passage of the USA 
FREEDOM Act, 2015 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (June 2, 2015); Press Release, 
Representative Jim Sensenbrenner, Goodlatte, Conyers, Sensenbrenner, Nadler Applaud 
Clean Passage of the USA FREEDOM Act in the Senate (June 2, 2015), 
https://sensenbrenner.house.gov/2015/6/goodlatte-conyers-sensenbrenner-nadler-applaud-
clean-passage-of-the-usa-freedom-act-in-the-senate [https://perma.cc/9RST-FEFL]. 
 133. Edward Snowden’s disclosures were first published on June 5, 2013, although 
some media reports date the disclosures as first published on June 6, 2013, with varying 
time zones. Greenwald, supra note 17; see also Mirren Gidda, Edward Snowden and the 
NSA Files – Timeline, GUARDIAN (Aug. 21, 2013, 5:54 PM), http://www.theguardian.com
/world/2013/jun/23/edward-snowden-nsa-files-timeline [https://perma.cc/KWN8-PHYB]. 
The Second Circuit issued its decision on May 7, 2015. ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d. 787, 
792 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 134. USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 101(a)(3), 129 Stat. 268, 269–
70 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(C) (2016)) (“[An] application for the production on 
a daily basis of call detail records . . . conducted to protect against international 
terrorism. “a statement of facts showing that . . . (1) there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that the call detail records sought to be produced based on the specific selection 
term required . . . are relevant to such investigation; and (ii) there are facts giving rise to 
a reasonable, articulable suspicion that such specific selection term is associated with a 
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”). 
 135. See, e.g., USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, § 101(b), 129 Stat. at 270; Steinhauer & 
Weisman, supra note 21 (“The storage of those records now shifts to the phone 
companies, and the government must petition a special federal court [FISC] for 
permission to search them.”). Because the FISC orders may remain largely classified, 
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practice of allowing the NSA to collect bulk telephony metadata 
records and then store the records for future use.136 In other words, 
under Section 215, bulk metadata collection came first and the 
querying of the database by the NSA came later on an as-needed 
basis, effectively allowing the NSA to control the maintenance and 
use of the bulk telephony metadata records.137 Congress found this 
practice objectionable because it gave the NSA apparently unfettered 
access to the metadata.138 Subsequently, Congress attempted to end it 
by placing a restraint on the government’s ability to collect records by 
forcing the government to seek the production of the metadata 
records directly from the corporate entity (e.g., telecommunications 
company or Internet provider) in the USA FREEDOM Act.139 
 
exactly how the USA Freedom Act will be implemented may remain unknown to the 
public. See, e.g., § 602(a), 129 Stat. at 281 (allowing declassification for opinions that 
include “a significant construction or interpretation of any provision of law, including any 
novel or significant construction or interpretation of the term ‘specific selection term’, and, 
consistent with that review, make publicly available to the greatest extent practicable each 
such decision, order, or opinion”). 
 136. See Cole, supra note 101 (explaining that under the USA FREEDOM Act, “the 
phone companies, not the NSA, would store the data”). Applications for orders to 
produce phone metadata records now must contain: 
(C) [A] statement of facts showing that— 
(i) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the call detail records sought to be 
produced based on the specific selection term required under subparagraph (A) 
are relevant to such investigation; and 
(ii) there is a reasonable, articulable suspicion that such specific selection term is 
associated with a foreign power engaged in international terrorism or activities in 
preparation therefor, or an agent of a foreign power engaged in international 
terrorism or activities in preparation therefor. 
USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, § 101(a)(3)(C), 129 Stat. at 270. 
 137. See ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 797 (2d Cir. 2015) (“The government 
explains that it uses the bulk metadata collected pursuant to these orders by making 
‘queries’ using metadata ‘identifiers’ (also referred to as ‘selectors’), or particular phone 
numbers that it believes, based on ‘reasonable articulable suspicion,’ to be associated with 
a foreign terrorist organization . . . . The identifier is used as a ‘seed’ to search across the 
government’s database; the search results yield phone numbers, and the metadata 
associated with them that have been in contact with the seed.”) 
 138. See Dan Froomkin, For the First Time Since 9/11, Congress Checks the Security 
State, INTERCEPT (June 1, 2015, 9:47 AM), https://theintercept.com/2015/06/01/first-time-
since-911-congress-checks-security-state/ [https://perma.cc/P6Z6-FDJR] (quoting Sen. Ron 
Wyden, D-Ore., as saying that, “[t]onight the collection of phone records of millions of 
innocent Americans will end” and “[t]he demise of this dragnet surveillance is a victory for 
the principle that Americans do not need to sacrifice liberty to have security”). 
 139. See e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 114-109, pt. 1, at 8–10, 17–18 (2015); 160 CONG. REC. 
H4793 (daily ed. May 22, 2014) (statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte) (“The USA 
FREEDOM Act makes clear that the government cannot indiscriminately acquire 
Americans’ call detail records and creates a new, narrowly tailored process for the 
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Next, by requiring the NSA to articulate specific information for 
the person, account, address, or other precise identifier that is the 
subject of a particular investigation, the USA FREEDOM Act seeks 
to limit the scope of records sought by the government.140 This 
contrasts with the prior practice, under Section 215 of the USA 
PATRIOT Act, where the metadata collection purportedly could 
proceed in an indiscriminate and suspicionless fashion.141 The bulk 
collection justification under Section 215 by the government arguably 
allowed the NSA to collect all metadata on all calls, regardless of 
whether a specific person, account, or address was under 
investigation.142 In enacting the USA FREEDOM Act, Congress 
appeared to agree with the Second Circuit in Clapper that Section 215 
could not be reasonably read to allow all telephony metadata as 
“relevant” to an investigation.143 Therefore, the USA FREEDOM 
 
collection of these records.”); 159 CONG. REC. S6052–54 (daily ed. July 30, 2013) 
(statement of Sen. Tom Udall) (calling for a targeted approach where the service 
providers maintain databases to meet national security needs while protecting Americans’ 
privacy); Cole, supra note 101. 
 140. See USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, § 101(a)(3)(C), 129 Stat. at 270 (requiring the 
necessary statement of facts to relate to a “specific selection term”). 
 141. See, e.g., In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of 
Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 06-05, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101368, at *3 
(FISA Ct. May 24, 2006) (“To the extent practicable, the Custodians of Records of [TEXT 
REDACTED] shall produce to NSA an electronic copy upon service of the appropriate 
secondary order, and continue production on an ongoing daily basis thereafter for the 
duration of this order, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, of the following tangible 
things: all call-detail records or ‘telephony metadata’ created by such companies as 
described above.”); see also Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 30 (D.D.C. 2013) 
(characterizing the bulk metadata collection program as allowing the Government to 
“indiscriminately collect[] [subscribers’] telephony metadata along with the metadata of 
hundreds of millions of other citizens without any particularized suspicion of 
wrongdoing”), rev’d on other grounds, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 142. See, e.g., In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of 
Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 13-80, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147002, at *1–4 
(FISA Ct. Apr. 25, 2013) (requiring the redacted party, which was soon revealed to be 
Verizon Business Network Services, Inc., to produce all daily telephony metadata to the 
FBI, except for communications “wholly originating and terminating in foreign 
countries”); Bart Forsyth, Banning Bulk: Passage of the USA FREEDOM Act and Ending 
Bulk Collection, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1307, 1312 (2015) (“With the bulk collection of 
telephony metadata, the government’s statement of facts [showing relevancy] merely 
articulates a supposed value in collecting data on every call. There [is nothing] to 
differentiate calls that are more likely to relate to the government’s investigation from 
every other call made by innocent Americans.”). 
 143. See ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 810–21 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding the 
government’s argument that metadata is “‘relevant’ because they may allow the NSA, at 
some unknown time in the future . . . to identify information that is relevant” to be 
“unprecedented and unwarranted”); see, e.g., Forsyth, supra note 142, at 1312 (“The 
government’s interpretation of the section is so broad that it ultimately conflates relevance 
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Act, unlike Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, appears to 
require a minimum demonstration that the metadata is related to a 
specific entity that is the subject of a specific investigation in order to 
establish that the metadata is “relevant” to that specific 
investigation.144 
Prior to enactment of the Act, the NSA was allowed to seek 
records associated with up to three “hops” from the original “seed.”145 
It is estimated that the “three-hop analysis” could result in the 
potential to query millions of phone records.146 The USA FREEDOM 
Act further limited the scope of the records that could be requested 
by restricting the number of “hops” from an original “seed” to two 
 
with utility—the records are relevant because the government believes it needs them. This 
is not a standard at all.”). 
 144. See Klayman v. Obama, 142 F. Supp. 3d 172, 180 (D.D.C. 2015) (“[T]he USA 
FREEDOM Act expressly prohibits the Government from obtaining telephony metadata 
in bulk.”). 
 145. President Obama implemented a revision from three “hops” to two “hops” prior 
to the enactment of the USA FREEDOM Act., Presidential Remarks on United States 
Signals Intelligence and Electronic Surveillance Programs, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. 
DOC. 7 (Jan. 17, 2014) (“Effective immediately, we will only pursue phone calls that are 
two steps removed from a number associated with a terrorist organization instead of the 
current three.”). President Obama also took additional action to limit the querying of 
the database of telephony metadata prior to the USA FREEDOM Act. Id. (“And I 
have directed the Attorney General to work with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court so that during this transition period, the database can be queried only after a 
judicial finding or in the case of a true emergency.”). 
 146. The “three-hop” analysis was revealed during congressional testimony on July 17, 
2013 in the aftermath of the Snowden disclosures. Pete Yost, Congress Expresses Anger 
Over NSA Surveillance Program, BOS. GLOBE (July 18, 2013), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/07/17/nsa-spying-under-fire-you-got-problem
/Ev73I1XwPYtvD2WFZ6idGK/story.html [https://perma.cc/BX5C-GQGZ (dark archive)] 
(“For the first time, NSA Deputy Director John C. Inglis disclosed that the agency 
sometimes conducts what is known as three-hop analysis. That means the government can 
look at the phone data of a suspected terrorist, plus the data of all of the contacts, then all 
of those people’s contacts, and all of those people’s contacts.”). The NSA explained that: 
“[w]ith three-hop analysis, [i]f the average person calls 40 unique people, three-hop 
analysis could allow the government to mine the records of 2.5 million Americans when 
investigating one suspected terrorist.” Id. The United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia explained further: 
In plain English, this means that if a search starts with telephone number (123) 
456–7890 as the “seed,” the first hop will include all the phone numbers that (123) 
456–7890 has called or received calls from in the last five years (say, 100 numbers), 
the second hop will include all the phone numbers that each of those 100 numbers 
has called or received calls from in the last five years (say, 100 numbers for each 
one of the 100 “first hop” numbers, or 10,000 total), and the third hop will include 
all the phone numbers that each of those 10,000 numbers has called or received 
calls from in the last five years (say, 100 numbers for each one of the 10,000 
“second hop” numbers, or 1,000,000 total).  
Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 16 (D.D.C. 2013) (citation omitted). 
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“hops,” or in other words, the FISC may order the production of “the 
call detail records associated with the initial telephone number [the 
“seed”] and the records associated with the records returned in the 
initial hop.”147 The first “hop” is comprised of all of the records 
associated with the “seed”; the second “hop” is comprised of all of the 
records associated with the first “hop.”148 Bart Forsyth deconstructs 
this concept further: 
A second “hop” does not include an individual listed in a 
telephone contact list, or on a personal device that uses the 
same wireless router as the seed, or that has similar calling 
patterns as the seed. Nor does it exist merely because a 
personal device has been in the proximity of another personal 
device. These types of information are not maintained by 
telecommunications carriers in the normal course of business 
and, regardless, are prohibited under the definition of ‘call 
detail records’ [under the USA FREEDOM Act].149 
 Finally, the USA FREEDOM Act implemented changes to the 
FISC, including allowing for the appointment of “amicus curiae” in 
FISC matters involving novel and significant interpretations of the 
law,150 and requiring more rigorous declassification reviews of FISC 
decisions.151 
Importantly, however, the Act has been criticized as being 
inadequate to its purpose.152 The criticism warrants careful attention 
 
 147. Forsyth, supra note 142, at 1339–40 (discussing Section 501 of the USA 
FREEDOM Act). 
 148. Id. at 1339 n.149. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Section 401 of the USA FREEDOM Act authorizes the presiding judge of the 
FISC to appoint at least five individuals to serve as “amicus curiae” to offer expertise in 
the application of the law to new technologies. Pub. L. No. 114-23, sec. 401, § 103, 129 
Stat. 268, 279–81 (2015) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (2016)). The amici 
attorneys are eligible for security clearances and “will be tasked with making arguments 
addressing privacy and civil liberties, and will have access to relevant materials, including 
government applications, petitions, and motions [subject to being eligible for any 
necessary security clearances].” PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., 
RECOMMENDATIONS ASSESSMENT REPORT 5 (2016), https://www.pclob.gov/library
/Recommendations_Assessment_Report_20160205.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6ZV-PVT6]. 
 151. Id. at 8 (“[T]he USA FREEDOM Act now requires that the government will 
conduct a declassification review of each new decision of the FISC and FISCR ‘that 
includes a significant construction or interpretation of any provision of law,’ . . . and that 
the government will make declassified versions of these opinions publicly available to the 
greatest extent practicable.”). 
 152. See, e.g., David Greene & Mark Jaycox, Op-ed: Why the EFF is Pulling its Support 
for the USA FREEDOM Act, ARS TECHNICA (May 12, 2015, 3:25 PM), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/05/op-ed-why-the-eff-is-pulling-its-support-for-the-
usa-freedom-act/ [https://perma.cc/Y82T-YUGU]; Neema Singh Guliani, What’s Next for 
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in that the Act may not be sufficient to correct the statutory and 
constitutional deficiencies of Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. 
Specifically, the Act may not curb bulk metadata collection for 
reasons that include, but are not limited to, the following three 
considerations. First, some argue that the Section 215 bulk telephony 
metadata program, as a “warrant”-based program (e.g., subject to 
FISC orders), was less problematic than warrantless bulk metadata 
collection programs.153 Thus, the primary focus of statutory reform, 
 
Surveillance Reform After the USA FREEDOM Act, ACLU (June 3, 2015, 6:15 PM), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/washington-markup/whats-next-surveillance-reform-after-usa-
freedom-act [https://perma.cc/M46T-NT85]. The USA Freedom Act, we hope, is only the 
beginning of this new era. The coalition that helped to advance the USA Freedom Act 
must now work to advance additional reforms. This includes: 
Urging both the president and Congress to rein in surveillance under Executive 
Order 12333, which has been used to collect information about millions of 
Americans absent any judicial process[;] 
Reforming Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (set to expire 
in 2017), which allows the government to collect the content of Americans’ 
communications with individuals abroad[;] 
Reforming other authorities, such as the administrative subpoena statutes, which 
have been used for bulk collection in the past[;] 
Further reforming the authorities addressed in the USA Freedom Act, including 
Section 215, FISA’s pen-register and trap-and-trace provisions, and national 
security letters[;] 
Rejecting efforts to expand surveillance through cybersecurity information-sharing 
legislation. 
Id; see also Kurt Opshal & Rainey Reitman, A Floor, Not a Ceiling: Supporting the USA 
FREEDOM ACT as a Step Towards Less Surveillance, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. 
(Nov. 14, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/floor-not-ceiling-supporting-usa-
freedom-act-step-towards-less-surveillance [https://perma.cc/LS9U-TLVR] (“It does not 
touch problems like NSA programs to sabotage encryption standards, it does not 
effectively tackle the issue of collecting information on people outside of the United 
States, and it doesn’t address the authority that the government is supposedly using to tap 
the data links between service provider data centers, such as those owned by Google and 
Yahoo.”). 
 153. See, e.g., 161 CONG. REC. E883 (daily ed. June 11, 2015) (statement of Hon. Ted 
Poe) (claiming that the USA FREEDOM Act would not end bulk surveillance because it 
“does nothing to limit government spying under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments 
Act”); AMOS TOH, FAIZA PATEL & ELIZABETH GOITEIN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, 
OVERSEAS SURVEILLANCE IN AN INTERCONNECTED WORLD 34 (2016), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Overseas_Surveillance_in_an
_Interconnected_World.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3UZ-TDHD] (discussing privacy impact of 
NSA’s surveillance activities through Executive Order 12333 and lack of transparency of 
such activities); Ashley Gorski & Patrick C. Toomey, Unprecedented and Unlawful: The 
NSA’s “Upstream” Surveillance, JUSTSECURITY (Sept. 19, 2016), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/33044/unprecedented-unlawful-nsas-upstream-surveillance/ 
[https://perma.cc/8Y4S-KY37] (challenging whether “Upstream” surveillance is authorized 
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according to some experts, should be on the warrantless collection of 
metadata and content data that was also revealed under the Snowden 
disclosures as justified under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act Amendments Act (“FAA”).154 Second, some 
scholars note that statutory reform is a necessary but not a sufficient 
step toward the proper regulation of big data cyber surveillance 
methods.155 They observe “that the Fourth Amendment must evolve 
along with” the statutory regime in order to properly restrain new and 
emerging surveillance methods, of which bulk metadata collection is 
 
by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments Act); Rainey Reitman, The 
New USA FREEDOM Act: A Step in the Right Direction, but More Must Be Done, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 30, 2015), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015
/04/new-usa-freedom-act-step-right-direction-more-must-be-done [https://perma.cc/2H93-
2ZCF] (“The new USA [FREEDOM] Act does not address Section 702 of the FISA 
Amendments Act, the problematic 2008 law that the government uses for PRISM and 
‘upstream’ mass surveillance.”); John Napier Tye, Meet Executive Order 12333: The 
Reagan Rule That Lets the NSA Spy on Americans, WASH. POST (July 18, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/meet-executive-order-12333-the-reagan-rule-that-
lets-the-nsa-spy-on-americans/2014/07/18/93d2ac22-0b93-11e4-b8e5-d0de80767fc2_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/TF9H-54NF] (explaining that although U.S. persons communications 
may not be targeted under Executive Order 12333, the executive order explicitly 
authorizes their retention if collected “incidentally” (with incidentally being “an NSA 
term of art”) during a lawful overseas foreign intelligence investigation). 
 154. See, e.g., Margulies, supra note 23, at 67–68. As a result of “sunset” clauses, 
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act was set to expire on June 1, 2015, whereas Section 
702 of the FISA Amendments Act was not set to expire until 2017. PATRIOT Sunsets 
Extension Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-14, § 2(a), 125 Stat. 216, 216 (codified in scattered 
sections of 50 U.S.C.); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012). Because Section 215 preceded 
Section 702 in expiration, Section 215 appeared to take precedence as a matter of 
legislative reform. See, e.g., Timothy Edgar, Without USA Freedom Act, NSA Could 
Resume Bulk Collection Even if Patriot Act Provisions Expire, LAWFARE (May 30, 2015, 
5:20 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/without-usa-freedom-act-nsa-could-resume-bulk-
collection-even-if-patriot-act-provisions-expire [https://perma.cc/62RH-HKEF]; Denise E. 
Zheng, Electronic Surveillance After Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act, CTR. FOR 
STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES (June 1, 2015), http://csis.org/publication/electronic-
surveillance-after-section-215-usa-patriot-act [https://perma.cc/SQ8F-QURT]. Nevertheless, 
the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act passed by floor vote on January 11, 2018. An 
Act to Amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 115-118, 132 
Stat. 3 (2018). 
 155. See, e.g., Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection, supra note 23, at 821; Donohue, 
Section 702, supra note 23, at 264–65. Professor Donohue recognized the need for a Fourth 
Amendment analysis, as well as the tension that exists when collecting programs are either 
seemingly performing the analysis themselves or are not fully understood such that human 
analysts can properly dispel Fourth Amendment concerns. See Donahue, Bulk Metadata 
Collection, supra note 23, at 821 (“[I]t appears that neither the NSA nor FISC had an 
adequate understanding of how the algorithms operate. Nor did they understand the type 
of information that had been incorporated into different databases, and whether they had 
been subjected to the appropriate legal analysis before data mining.”). 
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but one.156 Third, experts contend that strict compliance with the 
USA FREEDOM Act will not act as a constraint on metadata 
collection.157 Each of these criticisms will be briefly summarized 
below. 
First, beyond the Section 215 bulk telephony metadata 
program—which constituted bulk metadata collection pursuant to an 
order issued by the FISC—other authorities appear to have been 
interpreted by the intelligence community to allow for warrantless 
bulk metadata collection.158 From the Snowden disclosures, it appears 
that in some instances the NSA saw neither the need to resort to the 
FISC to seek query-specific orders nor the express need to seek data 
from a third-party provider (e.g., a telecommunications corporation 
or Internet provider).159 Under Section 702’s “UPSTREAM” 
 
 156. See, e.g., Jennifer Granick, Prediction: Fourth Amendment Evolves in 2014, JUST 
SECURITY (Dec. 31, 2013, 4:32 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/5195/prediction-fourth-
amendment-evolves-2014 [https://perma.cc/F2QM-5GNX] (“A consensus seems to be 
emerging that the Fourth Amendment must evolve along with technology and government 
surveillance capabilities.”). 
 157. See, e.g., Forsyth, supra note 142, at 1339; Ted Poe & Rand Paul, Poe, Rand: NSA 
Bulk Collection of Data Tramples Our Rights, HOUS. CHRON. (May 22, 2015, 9:20 PM), 
http://www.chron.com/opinion/outlook/article/Poe-Rand-NSA-bulk-collection-of-data-tramples-
6282272.php [https://perma.cc/N8DW-6UW9] (claiming that the USA FREEDOM Act 
would not end bulk surveillance because it “does nothing to limit government spying 
under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act”). The USA FREEDOM Act allows 
FISC to order companies to produce up to two “hops.” H.R. REP. NO. 114-109, pt. 1, at 17 
(2015). The new authority in the in the USA FREEDOM Act was “designed to allow the 
government to search telephone metadata for possible connections to international 
terrorism—[however, it] does not preclude the government’s use of standard business 
records orders under Section 501 to compel the production of business records, including 
call detail records.” Id. at 18. 
 158. See, e.g., Barton Gellman, Julie Tate & Ashkan Soltani, In NSA-Intercepted Data, 
Those Not Targeted Far Outnumber the Foreigners Who Are, WASH. POST. (July 5, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-nsa-intercepted-data-those-not
-targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreigners-who-are/2014/07/05/8139adf8-045a-11e4-8572-
4b1b969b6322_story.html [https://perma.cc/BRQ8-4CAD]; Elizabeth Goitein, Don’t Lose 
Track: Here’s What’s Going on with the NSA, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (July 8, 2014), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/dont-lose-track-heres-whats-going-nsa [https://perma.cc
/4RDZ-SHHP]. 
 159. From the Snowden disclosures, it appears that metadata surveillance is potentially 
justified under several legal authorities: Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, Section 
702 of FISA Amendments Act, and Executive Order 12333. Section 215 of the USA 
PATRIOT Act authorized the collection of “tangible things” that were relevant to an 
authorized investigation “to protect against international terrorism or clandestine 
intelligence activities.” USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, sec. 215, 
§ 501(a)(1), 115 Stat. 272, 287 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012)). Section 
215 of the USA PATRIOT Act expired on June 1, 2015, and was replaced by the USA 
FREEDOM Act. Jeremy Diamond, Patriot Act Provisions Have Expired: What Happens 
Now?, CNN (June 1, 2015, 10:48 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/05/30/politics/what-
happens-if-the-patriot-act-provisions-expire/index.html [https://perma.cc/BNP6-E49Q]. 
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collection program, for instance, it was revealed that the NSA has the 
capacity to directly intercept bulk metadata and collection the content 
of communications traveling through fiber-optic cables that comprise 
the so-called “Internet backbone.”160 The NSA justified direct tapping 
of the fiber-optic cables to collect metadata—specifically “discrete 
wholly domestic communications” from U.S. citizens “that are neither 
to, from, [or regarding] a targeted selector”—by citing its authority to 
collect foreigners’ data, and suggested that the data collected on U.S. 
persons through Section 702 was considered “incidental” and not 
purposeful and, thus, lawful.161 The federal courts have not yet had an 
opportunity to determine whether this reading of Section 702 is 
permissible.162 
 
Section 702 of FISA Amendments Act authorizes the Attorney General and the Director 
of National Intelligence to target non-U.S. persons “reasonably believed to be located 
outside the United States” for surveillance. FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110-261, sec. 101, § 702, 122 Stat. 2436, 2437–48 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1881a (2012)). Executive Order 12333 delegates to the Attorney General the power to 
authorize intelligence gathering pursuant to collection, dissemination and retention 
protocols set forth by the Order. Exec. Order No. 12333, § 2.5, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, 59,951 
(Dec. 4, 1981), as amended by Exec. Order No. 13284 § 18, 68 Fed. Reg. 4075, 4077 (Jan. 
23, 2003), Exec. Order No. 13355, 69 Fed. Reg. 53,593 (Aug. 27, 2004), and Exec. Order 
No. 13470, 73 Fed. Reg. 45,325 (July 30, 2008). 
 160. See, e.g., James Ball, Edward Snowden NSA Files: Secret Surveillance and Our 
Revelations So Far, GUARDIAN (Aug. 21, 2013, 3:36 PM), http://www.theguardian.com
/world/2013/aug/21/edward-snowden-nsa-files-revelations [https://perma.cc/7SGK-NMR9]; 
Craig Timberg, NSA Slide Shows Surveillance of Undersea Cables, WASH. POST (July 10, 
2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-nsa-slide-you-havent-seen
/2013/07/10/32801426-e8e6-11e2-aa9f-c03a72e2d342_story.html [https://perma.cc/J6KY-
76TK] (describing NSA slide that articulates UPSTREAM as accessing “communications 
on fiber cables and infrastructure as data flows past”). 
 161. See [Redacted], 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157706, at *104 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011) 
(“The government stresses that the non-target communications of concern here (discrete 
wholly domestic communications and other discrete communications to or from a United 
States person or a person in the United States that are neither to, from, nor about a 
targeted selector) are acquired incidentally rather than purposefully.”); see also James Ball 
& Spencer Ackerman, NSA Loophole Allows Warrantless Search for US Citizens’ Emails 
and Phone Calls, GUARDIAN (Aug. 9, 2013, 12:08 PM), http://www.theguardian.com
/world/2013/aug/09/nsa-loophole-warrantless-searches-email-calls [https://perma.cc/SA8E-
8KXD]. 
 162. See, e.g., Donohue, Section 702, supra note 23, at 259–63 (“The petitioner’s 
concern with incidental collections is overblown. It is settled beyond peradventure that 
incidental collections occurring as a result of constitutionally permissible acquisitions do 
not render those acquisitions unlawful. The government assures us that it does not 
maintain a database of incidentally collected information from non-targeted United States 
persons, and there is no evidence to the contrary. On these facts, incidentally collected 
communications of non-targeted United States persons do not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.”) (quoting In re Directives [redacted text] Pursuant to Section 105B of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1015 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) (citations 
omitted))); see also Joshua A.T. Fairfield & Erik Luna, Digital Innocence, 99 CORNELL L. 
REV. 981, 1025–26 (2014) (citing United States v. Mohamud, 941 F. Supp. 2d 1303 (D. Or. 
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Second, under the Fourth Amendment, it is unresolved under 
what circumstances the collection of metadata may constitute an 
unreasonable search or seizure.163 The Fourth Amendment’s third-
party doctrine may be interpreted by the Supreme Court to allow for 
bulk metadata collection.164 Further, the USA FREEDOM Act 
expressly limits bulk telephony metadata collection only—it does not 
appear to limit the type of metadata that can be generated by emails, 
Internet searches and web-browsing history, social media network 
activities, or information retained by smart technologies and other 
electronic devices.165  
And, third, so long as the underlying presumption of efficacy 
persists, the intelligence community will likely collect the bulk 
metadata that it perceives it needs to serve purportedly mission-
 
2013)). In several cases, the defendant challenged the permissibility of the government 
withholding secret NSA surveillance evidence during discovery. Fairfield & Luna, supra at 
1026 n.294. 
 163. See, e.g., Klayman v. Obama, 142 F. Supp. 3d 172, 195–98 (D.D.C. 2015) 
(concluding plaintiff’s claim that Section 215 program is unconstitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment has a likelihood of success on the merits and ordering injunction, blocking 
the final weeks of the Section 215 program prior to the implementation of the USA 
FREEDOM Act’s reforms to metadata collection), staying order, 2015 WL 9010330 (D.C. 
Cir. 2015), rehearing denied en banc, 805 F.3d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (mem.); United States 
v. Moalin, No. 10cr4246 JM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164038, at *21 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 
2013) (holding that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in telephony metadata 
under the Fourth Amendment). 
 164. See, e.g., ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 751–52 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[W]hen 
a person voluntarily conveys information to a third party, he forfeits his right to privacy in 
the information . . . . The collection of breathtaking amounts of information 
unprotected by the Fourth Amendment does not transform that sweep [of bulk telephony 
metadata collection] into a Fourth Amendment search.”), vacated, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 
2015); In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things, 
No. BR 15-75, 2015 WL 5637562, at *9 (FISA Ct. June 29, 2015) (“Prior FISC opinions 
have unanimously concluded that the production of call detail records to the government 
does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, relying on [Smith v. 
Maryland].” (citing 442 U.S. 735 (1979)). 
 165. USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 101, 129 Stat. 268, 269–71 
(2015) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2) (2016)). An argument could be made that the 
USA FREEDOM Act pertains to all metadata records and is not intended to regulate 
only telephony metadata collection in that Section 103 is titled, “Prohibition on the Bulk 
Collection of All Tangible Things.” See id. However, the USA FREEDOM Act expressly 
refers to the regulation of “call detail records” in Section 101, thereby suggesting that the 
focus of the statute is on bulk telephony metadata collection. Id. Further, the USA 
FREEDOM ACT appears to limit its restrictions to bulk collection of domestic records 
and not bulk collection of foreign records, or records collected outside of the U.S. See, e.g., 
Donohue, Section 702, supra note 23, at 139–53 (explaining that bulk collection methods 
can proceed under multiple legal authorities including Section 702 of FISA Amendments 
Act and Executive Order 12333); Margaret Hu, Taxonomy of the Snowden Disclosures, 72 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1679, 1689–90 (2015). 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1425 (2018) 
2018] BULK BIOMETRIC METADATA COLLECTION 1467 
critical counterterrorism objectives.166 Procedurally, this can occur 
through technical compliance with the USA FREEDOM Act. The 
intelligence community, under the USA FREEDOM Act, may 
request orders from the FISC in a manner that may elicit a volume of 
metadata records on par with volumes achieved under Section 215’s 
bulk telephony metadata collection program.167 Despite Congress’s 
attempts to statutorily curtail bulk metadata collection, intelligence 
agencies can still do so by working within and around the procedural 
parameters of the USA FREEDOM Act (e.g., the intelligence 
community may: delegate bulk metadata collection to other agencies, 
contractors, and entities, such as state and local law enforcement; 
purchase bulk metadata; negotiate direct access to metadata through 
 
 166. See, e.g., Hu, supra note 102, at 773 (describing the expansion of “collect-it-all” 
data tools); Granick, supra note 156 (describing how without Fourth Amendment 
restrictions, the economics and technology of mass surveillance will encourage the 
government to continue”. 
 167. See Schlanger, supra note 39, at 129 (“[T]he FISA Court now signs off on a 
massive program of targeted surveillance of foreigners—including when their 
communication is with an American.”). The USA FREEDOM Act was criticized as 
potentially ineffective because the Act attempts to eliminate bulk collection through 
requiring the NSA to limit its request for data through a “specific selection term” 
restriction. See, e.g., H.L. Pohlman, The NSA FREEDOM Act?, WASH. POST (May 27, 
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/05/27/the-nsa-freedom-
act/ [https://perma.cc/3BHW-JYZJ] (“Their first concern, and the one most widely noted, 
is with the new definition of the kinds of ‘specific selection terms’ that the National 
Security Agency (NSA) could use when applying for court orders for the production of 
call detail records from private phone companies. What will NSA be searching for?”). 
Under the USA FREEDOM Act, particularly controversial was how to define “specific 
selection term” as a requirement for the basis of production of data and as a method to 
limit bulk collection of data. See, e.g., Forsyth, supra note 142, at 1335–36. “[T]here was no 
aspect of the bill that garnered more intense focus than the definition of specific selection 
term. It was primarily this definition that led many technology companies and privacy 
groups to pull their support for the USA FREEDOM Act after it first passed the House in 
2014.” Id. at 1336. Bart Forsyth, chief of staff to Congressman F. James Sensenbrenner, 
explained the controversy this way: “By requiring a specific selection term, the USA 
FREEDOM Act therefore, by definition, ended bulk collection. But would this new 
limitation be sufficient in practice?” Id. at 1335 (footnote omitted). The USA FREEDOM 
Act limits the definition of a “specific selection term” so that it “cannot be used to identify 
an ‘electronic service provider’ or a ‘broad geographic area.’” Id. at 1337 (citing USA 
FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 107(k)(4)(A)(i)–(ii), 129 Stat. at 273). 
“[T]he key to the new legal standard is that the specific selection term must be ‘used to 
limit, to the greatest extent reasonably practicable, the volume of tangible things sought 
consistent with the purpose for seeking the tangible things.’” Id. (quoting USA 
FREEDOM Act, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 107(k)(4)(A)(i)(II), 129 Stat. at 274.). “The 
[specific selection term] is, therefore, not intended to put a cap on the total amount of 
records, but instead, to limit the number of records to the greatest extent possible.” Id. at 
1337–38 (citing 161 CONG. REC. S2772 (daily ed. May 12, 2015)). 
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cooperative relationships with telecommunications and Internet 
providers; etc.).168 
Consequently, under the USA FREEDOM Act, it is unclear 
whether bulk metadata collection will cease and, thus, whether mass 
suspicion-less tracking of metadata by the intelligence community will 
continue in an under-regulated manner. 
III.  POST-USA FREEDOM ACT 
Absent any Supreme Court decision addressing the issue, the 
government has argued that the NSA’s bulk telephony metadata 
program could continue temporarily.169 Immediately after Congress 
passed the USA FREEDOM Act and President Barack Obama 
signed the Act into law on June 2, 2015, the DOJ filed a motion with 
the FISC seeking permission to extend the NSA’s bulk telephony 
metadata collection program for an additional 180 days.170 The 
motion cited a need to ensure an “orderly transition” from the prior 
bulk telephony metadata collection program under Section 215 of the 
 
 168. See, e.g., Julia Angwin et al., AT&T Helped U.S. Spy on Internet on a Vast Scale, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/us/politics/att-helped-nsa-
spy-on-an-array-of-internet-traffic.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/9QUZ-MM82 (dark 
archive)]; Ryan Deveraux, Glenn Greenwald & Laura Poitras, Data Pirates of the 
Caribbean: The NSA is Recording Every Cell Phone Call in the Bahamas, INTERCEPT 
(May 19, 2014, 12:37 PM), https://theintercept.com/2014/05/19/data-pirates-caribbean-nsa-
recording-every-cell-phone-call-bahamas/ [https://perma.cc/G6MP-2BF8]; Glenn 
Greenwald et al., Microsoft Handed the NSA Access to Encrypted Messages, GUARDIAN 
(July 12, 2013, 3:04 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/microsoft-nsa-
collaboration-user-data [https://perma.cc/4Y4T-8A7K]; Brad Heath, U.S. Secretly Tracked 
Billions of Calls for Decades, USA TODAY (Apr. 8, 2015, 10:36 AM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/04/07/dea-bulk-telephone-surveillance-operation
/70808616/ [https://perma.cc/JQ9R-MS2V] (“For more than two decades, the Justice 
Department and the Drug Enforcement Administration amassed logs of virtually all 
telephone calls from the USA to as many as 116 countries linked to drug trafficking, 
current and former officials involved with the operation said”); Jeremy Scahill & Josh 
Begley, The Great SIM Heist: How Spies Stole the Keys to the Encryption Castle, 
INTERCEPT (Feb. 19, 2015, 2:25 PM), https://theintercept.com/2015/02/19/great-sim-heist/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZPL7-5ZEN]; Craig Timberg & Ellen Nakashima, Agreements with 
Private Companies Protect U.S. Access to Cables’ Data for Surveillance, WASH. POST (July 
6, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/agreements-with-private-
companies-protect-us-access-to-cables-data-for-surveillance/2013/07/06/aa5d017a-df77-11e2
-b2d4-ea6d8f477a01_story.html?tid=a_inl [https://perma.cc/3AQA-SWCZ]. 
 169. See Memorandum of Law at 1, In Re Application of the FBI for an Order 
Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things, No. BR 15-75, 2015 WL 5637562 (FISA Ct. June 
29, 2015) (arguing that “Section 1861, as amended by the USA FREEDOM Act, 
authorizes the [FISA] Court to approve the Government’s application for the bulk 
production of call detail records for a 180 day transition period,” and that “such 
authorization is appropriate notwithstanding the Second Circuit’s recent panel opinion in 
[Clapper]”). 
 170. Id. 
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USA PATRIOT Act, and the Justice Department argued that the 
USA FREEDOM Act expressly allows for an extension of bulk 
telephony metadata collection for an additional 180 days.171 
The key question centers upon what the program now resembles, 
given that the USA FREEDOM Act went into effect as of December 
1, 2015. Put another way, the question remains whether the NSA has 
facilitated an “orderly transition” from the Section 215 bulk 
telephony metadata collection program to another similar bulk 
telephony metadata collection program that is technically within 
compliance with the USA FREEDOM Act.172 As mentioned above, 
the Act does not prohibit the delegation of bulk telephony metadata 
collection to other agencies and entities; requesting orders from the 
FISC in a manner that achieves a similar volume to the prior bulk 
metadata collection program; and intensifying metadata collection 
under Section 702 of the FAA and Executive Order 12333.173 Shifting 
the justification for bulk metadata collection to other legal authorities 
allows the NSA and other intelligence organizations to collect in the 
absence of order requirements now specified under the USA 
FREEDOM Act. 
Moreover, the USA FREEDOM Act only speaks to bulk 
telephony metadata collection that had previously been justified 
under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act.174 The Act does not 
regulate mass metadata collection generated by emails, Internet 
searches and web-browsing history, social media network activities, 
and information retained by smart technologies and other electronic 
devices, as mentioned above.175 So long as the intelligence community 
perceives bulk metadata is needed to support a big data 
 
 171. Id. at 5–6 (“Congress recognized the need for an orderly transition period that 
preserves an important foreign intelligence collection capability until the Government 
may effectively avail itself of the new provisions for a targeted production.”). 
 172. See supra notes 155–56 and accompanying text. 
 173. See supra notes 165–68 and accompanying text. 
 174. See Cole, supra note 101 (“The bill is addressed almost entirely to the NSA’s 
domestic surveillance, but the vast majority of the agency’s spying is conducted overseas 
and directed at foreigners. Under those programs, which are not touched by the USA 
[FREEDOM] Act, the agency has, for example, recorded the contents of every phone call 
for a year in some countries; vacuumed up massive amounts of Internet data on wholly 
innocent persons; and collected the contents of phone calls, e-mails, and Internet activity 
of millions of innocent people. Because these measures are targeted at foreigners, they 
don’t generate the same level of concern here as at home. But these programs implicate 
our rights, too, as they routinely intercept communications between US citizens and 
foreign persons. Even an e-mail from Poughkeepsie to Peoria may be routed through 
France or England without our knowing it, and thus be subject to NSA interception.”). 
 175. See MacAskill, supra note 36. 
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cybersurveillance architecture176 that has been built for over a 
decade—an architecture that, based upon modest estimates, reflects 
an investment of billions of dollars177—the task of bringing bulk 
metadata collection under closer oversight is an extraordinarily 
difficult one. 
It is particularly instructive to point out that in ACLU v. 
Clapper,178 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
concluded with a discussion of the constitutional issues raised by the 
bulk telephony metadata program, noting that, on this issue, “the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is in some turmoil.”179 But instead of 
trying to resolve that turmoil, the Second Circuit rested its decision 
on its statutory findings and noted that the legislative branch is 
“better positioned than the courts . . . to pass judgment on the value 
of the telephone metadata program as a counterterrorism tool.”180 
Yet, importantly, in its motion filed with the FISC days after the 
passage of the USA FREEDOM Act, the DOJ argued that the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit opinion in Clapper is not 
binding on the FISC.181 The government argued that “[the FISA] 
Court’s analysis of Section 215 reflects the better interpretation of the 
statute” and called on the court to continue to apply it.182 Only one 
judge in one federal court, Judge Leon in the District Court of 
Washington, D.C., held that bulk metadata collection posed a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.183 
The circuit split stems from diametrically opposing views of 
whether bulk metadata collection is protected by the Fourth 
 
 176. Experts increasingly describe big data surveillance in architectural terms. See, e.g., 
BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH: THE HIDDEN BATTLES TO COLLECT YOUR 
DATA AND CONTROL YOUR WORLD 48 (2015) (“This has evolved into a shockingly 
extensive, robust, and profitable surveillance architecture.”). 
 177. “[The National Archives, Information Security Oversight Office] has studied how 
much the federal government spends just to keep secrets secret. The price tag: $10 billion 
a year.” DANA PRIEST & WILLIAM M. ARKIN, TOP SECRET AMERICA: THE RISE OF THE 
NEW AMERICAN SECURITY STATE 24 (2011). “The budget [for intelligence] had been 
estimated to be $75 billion a year, which did not include all the military’s spending on 
counterterrorism and intelligence.” Id. at 103. 
 178. 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 179. Id. at 821–23 (referring to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence leading up to, and 
including, United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012)). 
 180. Id. at 824. 
 181. Memorandum of Law, supra note 169, at 7; see also Spencer Ackerman, Obama 
Lawyers Asked Secret Court to Ignore Public Court’s Decision on Spying, GUARDIAN 
(June 9, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/09/obama-fisa-court-
surveillance-phone-records [https://perma.cc/7ST9-J7HE]. 
 182. Memorandum of Law, supra note 169, at 7. 
 183. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 32 (D.D.C. 2013), rev’d on other grounds, 
800 F.3d 599 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
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Amendment and whether the third-party doctrine controls such 
collection. The core of the third-party doctrine, established in Smith v. 
Maryland,184 is that an individual lacks a subjective expectation of 
privacy in data shared with a third party—which in this case is the 
telephone provider.185 In the Southern District of New York, Judge 
Pauley determined that the third-party doctrine eliminated the 
possibility of a Fourth Amendment violation because customers 
shared their telephony metadata with a third party186—Verizon—thus, 
there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the metadata.187 As 
noted above, the Second Circuit reversed Judge Pauley’s decision on 
appeal, but only by avoiding the constitutional issue and deciding the 
case on statutory grounds.188  
 Judge Leon chose to confront the constitutional issue, finding 
that the third-party doctrine from Smith v. Maryland was not 
controlling. Katz v. United States189 requires a two-step analysis: 
beginning with the question of whether the individual had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, one then moves to the question of 
whether society would ratify that expectation as reasonable.190 Under 
this test, an individual seemingly could not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the metadata from her telephone because 
the data had been shared with a third party, the telephone company; 
therefore, the bulk telephony metadata program would not be 
unconstitutional. But Judge Leon contended that such a result would 
be unreasonable and contrary to the spirit of Katz, arguing that the 
technological changes “have resulted in a greater expectation of 
privacy and a recognition that society views that expectation as 
reasonable.”191 His decision, while bold, ultimately was overturned by 
the D.C. Circuit: based on standing concerns, that court vacated the 
preliminary injunction that the district court had granted.192 
 
 184. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 185. Id. at 743–44. 
 186. Id.  
 187. ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 751 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), vacated, 785 F.3d 
787, 792 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 188. See supra notes 178–80 and accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit’s 
opinion). 
 189. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 190. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (clearly outlining the twofold test). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Obama v. Klayman, 800 F.3d 559, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (explaining that “the facts 
marshaled by plaintiffs do not fully establish that their own metadata was ever collected”). 
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CONCLUSION 
The USA FREEDOM Act is a significant legislative 
accomplishment, reflecting an impressive bipartisan effort. The clear 
intent of the USA FREEDOM Act is to impose meaningful limits on 
bulk metadata collection. The extent to which it will succeed is an 
open question, but the law has included important oversight 
protections. Because the FISC operates in a shroud of secrecy, the 
USA FREEDOM Act is an accomplishment in that it both increases 
transparency measures and implements additional accountability 
measures. By allowing for the declassification of certain FISC 
opinions, the USA FREEDOM Act may increase the chance that the 
public can understand how the FISC is interpreting the USA 
FREEDOM Act. The USA FREEDOM Act allows for public 
reporting by service provider companies, therefore, theoretically, 
significant increases in collection may be reported by the private 
sector. The USA FREEDOM Act also reflects structural changes to 
how the FISC operates. It allows for the appointment of amicus 
curiae to represent alternative perspectives to the court. Further, 
under the Section 215 program, bulk metadata collection was 
authorized by the FISC as a wholesale program, however, queries of 
the data were not court-approved. Under the USA FREEDOM Act, 
queries now are subject to FISC approval. 
The reforms to Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, which 
was used to justify the bulk telephony metadata collection program 
revealed by the Snowden disclosures, appear to apply to the 
government as a whole, not just the NSA; and arguably, the text of 
the law on its face could be read to apply to the collection of all 
records—not just metadata or even telephony metadata. The law also 
attempts to limit potential bulk collection under the Pen Register, or 
Trap and Trace, authority and national security letters.193 
Yet, bulk metadata collection is largely under-regulated by the 
current federal legislative scheme governing U.S. surveillance 
activities. The USA FREEDOM Act’s “specific selection term” 
 
 193. See ODNI Announces Transition to New Telephone Metadata Program, OFFICE 
DIR. NAT’L INTELLIGENCE (Nov. 27, 2015), https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post
/134069716908/odni-announces-transition-to-new-telephone [https://perma.cc/KWL3-
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IV of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), or pursuant to National Security 
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requirement could be interpreted broadly;194 the definition of a query 
could be expanded;195 “incidental” collection could still sweep in 
metadata collection in bulk;196 and limiting the collection to two 
“hops” means potentially millions of “call detail records” can still be 
collected under the Act.197 U.S. federal courts appear to be conflicted 
about how to treat metadata collection under the federal scheme that 
is intended to subject it to proper oversight. Moreover, it is unclear 
how metadata surveillance falls within the preexisting Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence of the U.S. Constitution. In implementing 
the USA FREEDOM Act, the FISC has declined to follow, for 
example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s opinion 
in Clapper, and suggested that it is awaiting resolution of the issue of 
the constitutionality of metadata surveillance by the Supreme 
Court.198 
 
 194. See, e.g., Reitman, supra note 153 (“[T]he specific selection term is the basis for 
the query that the government uses when it collects records. A broad selection term 
(‘People in California’ or ‘People with Verizon phones’) would mean massive record 
collection, but carefully constructed and defined specific selection terms would strictly 
limit the collection.”). 
 195. See, e.g., Elizabeth Goitein, The FBI’s Warrantless Surveillance Back Door Just 
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 196. See, e.g., Faiza Patel, Bulk Collection Under Section 215 Has Ended . . . What’s 
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 197. See, e.g., supra notes 146–50 and accompanying text. 
 198. See In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible 
Things, No. BR 15-75, 2015 WL 5637562, at *7 (FISA Ct. June 29, 2015) (stating that the 
Second Circuit’s ruling is not binding on the FISC; Order declining to follow Second 
Circuit approach).  
The Court is aware that, prior to enactment of the USA FREEDOM Act, the 
Second Circuit in Clapper rejected the government’s arguments that the call detail 
records acquired under the NSA program were relevant to an authorized 
investigation other than a threat assessment as required by section 501(b)(2)(A) 
and (c)(1) of FISA. However, Second Circuit rulings are not binding on the FISC, 
and this Court respectfully disagrees with that Court’s analysis, especially in view 
of the intervening enactment of the USA FREEDOM Act. As Judge Eagan 
stated: “Taken together, the [section 501] provisions are designed to permit the 
government wide latitude to seek the information it needs to meet its national 
security responsibilities, but only in combination with specific procedures for the 
protection of U.S. person information that are tailored to the production and with 
an opportunity for the authorization to be challenged. 
Id. at *15 (alteration in original). On June 5, 2017, the Court granted certiorari in 
Carpenter v. United States, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016). See Carpenter v. United States, 
No. 16-402, 2017 WL 2407484 (U.S. June 5, 2017). In Carpenter, the Court will decide 
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Finally, there is no conclusive evidence thus far that bulk 
metadata collection—bulk telephony or non-telephony metadata such 
as bulk biometric data collection or bulk biometric metadata 
collection—is efficacious.199 Consequently, an assessment of the 
efficacy of these rapidly emerging metadata collection methods 
should become integral to any future statutory reform, and future 
oversight and compliance reform efforts.200 Efficacy determinations 
can also serve an important role in an evolution of the constitutional 
inquiry under the Fourth Amendment.201 Even with passage of the 
USA FREEDOM Act, metadata surveillance is likely to continue to 
proceed under-regulated until the courts resolve the constitutionality 
of newly emerging methods of metadata surveillance and bulk 
metadata collection. Consequently, the cybersurveillance potential of 
smart body cameras or smart glasses worn by law enforcement offers 
and important case study for understanding how the USA 
FREEDOM Act is unable to regulate bulk biometric data collection 
of bulk biometric metadata collection. 
 
 
“[w]hether the warrantless seizure and search of historical cell phone records revealing the 
location and movements of a cell phone user over the course of 127 days is permitted by 
the Fourth Amendment.” Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 10–11, Carpenter, 819 F.3d 
880 (No. 16-402). 
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